TAKE COVER

Have you got the necessary protection for your assets?

 The following information was supplied by the Military Police Association of Australia to make former and serving military personnel aware of the significant value of their honours and awards. Not only do they have high sentimental value to the recipient and their families etc, they have in most instances great value to boot.

Therefore some serious consideration should be given to the fact that they are a substantial asset within the household when considering house and contents insurance.  The inclusion of medals as a SPECIAL ITEM is most often overlooked

Below is a brief list of the more common medals awarded to Australian Service Men and Women and their current value. Food for thought and you can quickly do the sums. 

Top end value relates to a medal in its original box untouched and unmounted.  Bottom end value relates to a medal in very poor condition with no ribbon or mounting.

The author of this information states that 90% of the medals that pass through his hands ARE at the top end of this scale. Some groups of the medals depending on the uniqueness can be valued higher again.

The following list is the “Name of the Medal”, Bottom End Value and Top End Value.

AASM 45-75	$243.00 - $365.00	INTERFET	$1220.00 - $1950.00
Vietnam Campaign	$365.00 - $730.00	Afghanistan Campaign	$1220.00 - $1700.00
Vietnam Logistics	$490.00   $500.00	Iraq Campaign	$1220.00 - $1700.00
AASM 75 - (depending on clasp)	$490.00 - $3700.00	ASM 75 - (depending on clasp)	$490.00 - $3700.00
DFSM + $25 per clasp	$243.00 - $490.00	DSLM + $25 per clasp	$490.00 - $730.00
National Medal	$365.00 - $400.00	ADM	$234.00

RUSSIA ACCEPTS RIMPAC 08 INVITATION

Russia has accepted an invitation to participate in this year’s Rim of the Pacific naval exercises ADML Robert Willard USN, commander of the US Pacific Fleeted, stated at the 7^th annual Hawaii-US Military Partnership Conference on 3 January 2008. “Whether that will continue to hold, given the political dynamic association with Russian military and ours and our various administrations will remain to be seen,” Willard Said, “but they showed up at the mid-planning conference (in November 07) with an expectation to actually participate this year. That is great progress.”

RIMPAC is a biennial, multinational exercise held in Hawaiian waters. Russia was invited to observe the 2004 and 2006 RIMPAC exercises but did not send observers. “Russia is a member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and Russian participation in RIMPAC would further US Maritime Strategy objectives of the developing collaborative partnerships and strengthening collective security,” Pacific Fleet spokesman Mark Matsunaga said.

“Working together with partners in the Pacific builds confidence and trust to allow the partners to focus on common threats, combat trans-national crime, strengthen maritime security and achieve mutual interests,” Matsunaga said

China has not been invited to participate or observe RIMPAC 08. The US National Defence Authorisation Act of 2000 precludes direct military-to-military contacts with China, except for search-and-rescue and humanitarian assistance operations.

A small Chinese contingent did observe RIMPAC in 1998, before that law was passed.  In 2006, a waiver to the restrictions allowed a Chinese team to observe a portion of the Valiant Shield exercise off Guam. However, there are no plans to invite China as a participant or observer for RIMPAC 2008.

From “The Navy”- The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia, Volume 70 No2, April-June 2008.

   Editor’s Comment:

Well, finally the Russians have been formally invited to participate in RIMPAC exercises!

In 1971, HMAS Onslow was one of five RAN platforms, which included the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne and destroyers Hobart, Torrens and Yarra to sail to Hawaii to participate in the very first RIMPAC.

At this time I was undertaking my ‘Part Three’ and I was learning the rudiments of the sonar sets in the sound lounge; my Sea Daddy at the time was Killick UC Jock Copeland.  During the ‘first watch’ Jock had me sit at one of the sets (now forgotten which one) and listen for unusual marine sounds/noises, he had plugged into the set and described what I was listening to and what I had to ignore, they being the usual fish sounds etc, my job was to listen up and down the frequency and report anything unusual to him. I had been doing this for a while during our watch, when all of a sudden a loud thrashing noise assaulted my ears, I called Jock over, and he plugged in and listened, then reported to the CO, LCDR Paddy Ryan RN that we had picked up a nuclear submarine contact in fairly close quarters.  On giving the coordinates our CO brought the boat to periscope depth and began to scan the surface for our noise source. In the distance the CO spotted a large fishing trawler and decided that this was the source of our noise.

Well, with that, we were disappointed that our discovery was relegated to a surface ship and thought nothing more of the noise source. That was until the following day when we surfaced and took onboard various UC ranks from a New Zealand destroyer who had come to look over a working submarine. Jock, who was on watch with me in tow, was delegated to give the Kiwis a tour through the boat, we had started our tour in the fore-ends and by the time we got to outside the galley one of the UCs stated, “Did you pick up that Russian submarine last night.” Jock surprised, said “Come with me” and took the group straight to the CO’s cabin and after knocking and receiving an answer, Jock told the UC to repeat what he had said to him to our CO. After listening to the UC, our CO stated, “Oh well, too bad now.” Jock replied, “No it is not, I recorded the noise source.” On the boat’s return to Pearl Harbour, Jock went ashore and had the USN analyse the tape, we were informed that it was definitely a Russian nuclear submarine. So it appears that the Russian Navy have probably attended every RIMPAC exercise unofficially since day one. Ed.         

SUBMARINE ACCIDENTS AND ESCAPES

The following is a lecture given circa 1955/6, I suspect it was written and given by Captain George Hunt. It was found in the Michael White research material kept in the Submarine Collection on Spectacle Island.

This lecture deals with the ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘A’ class, Excalibur and Explorer submarines that were in commission at the time. Some of the changes to assist submarine escape mentioned at the end of the lecture would be incorporated in the ‘P’ class being built at the time; of course, submariners who served in the next class, the Oberons, would recognise the escape systems then being planned.

If any member who was an escape coxswain would like to finish the history of escape from where this story ends to the present day to refect the changes of the passed 50 years, I will be happy to publish your work.   

Some sections of this lecture have been updated to reflect the difference of fifty odd years. Ed.

“The first British submarine accident occurred just over 104 years ago in March 1904 when A.1 was rammed while submerged by the SS Berwick Castle off the Nab and sank with the loss of all hands. Between this date and the beginning of the First World War a further five accidents occurred. Two of these accidents were caused by submarines being run down by a ship while submerged; two collided with ships while on the surface and were holed and sank, and two were what might be called submarine accidents in which some failure of the men or material let in the sea. All subsequent submarine accidents have also been attributable to one of these three causes. In all six of these pre-World War 1 accidents practically the whole crew were drowned instantly, the only survivors being those who floated off before the submarine sank.

“Salvage was practicable with such small vessels and indeed four out of six submarines were salved in periods varying 4 days to five weeks. After the loss of A.1, therefore, the official escape policy was to try and salvage the submarine and save the crew. In no case was anybody saved by salvage, and, indeed the chance of saving anyone was remote, as the submarines had no bulkheads and were generally flooded throughout as soon as the accident occurred. The most important contributions to submarine safety lay in the material and other lessons learnt which made accidents in the future less likely. For instance after A.1, a lower hatch was fitted at the bottom of the conning tower. In a subsequent similar collision in which A.9 was involved, the submarine was undoubtedly saved by this modification, this lesson has not been lost sight of and all present day submarines have a lower conning tower hatch and whenever any valve or service passes through the hull, its integrity is always ensued by a valve. A no less important contribution to submarine safety was the knowledge that the only hope of survival was not to have an accident. The submarine service thus built up its reputation for meticulous care in everything to do with the operation of the submarine and for the methodical checking and maintenance of all equipment. Such a tradition is likely to save far more lives than any number of interlocks and escape equipment.

“In 1912 or thereabouts, the first practical steps to save life after a submarine disaster was taken in the design of the ‘E’ Class. Her bulkheads were fitted for the first time to divide the submarine into several watertight compartments. After an accident only one compartment was expected to be flooded and it was hoped that some survivors would still be alive in the un-flooded compartments. There would be some point in attempting to salvage them to save them. Two years later, in 1914, the first ideas that it might be possible for survivors to make an escape from a  submarine as apposed to the submarine being salved to save them took the practical form in the issue of the Hall Rees apparatus. This was bulky self-contained breathing set, with a helmet the size of a diver’s suit. Only one was carried in each submarine and it was to be used to escape from the conning tower. This apparatus was landed after two years as being too cumbersome and complicated and dangerous to use. It is of interest however as it was the ancestor of the Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus.

“Bulkheads saved the first man in August, 1916, when E.4 and E.41 collided during exercises and both sunk. In E.41 most of the crew escaped up the conning tower before she sank but a Stoker Petty Officer Brown was trapped in the engine room. He had no escape gear and his main problem was to get the hatch open and hope to float to the surface. It is not perhaps generally appreciated that even at the shallow depth of 30 feet (9.14 metres) at which E.41 lay, the sea pressure exerts a force of some seven tons on a hatch holding it tight shut. There is never the remotest possibility of opening it by brute strength. The only way is to let the sea into the compartment and flood it up so that the pressure is the same on both sides of the hatch. It can then be opened quiet easily. Stoker Petty Officer Brown did this and succeeded in opening the hatch. Every time he did so however, a bubble of air went out, the pressure in the compartment propped and the hatch slammed down again, on one occasion on his hand.  He then had to flood up again to balance the pressure. After the third try the compartment was completely flooded but the hatch stayed open and then taking a deep breath, he floated to the surface. This was the first escape in the Royal Navy from a submerged submarine. It was only from 30 feet (9.14 metres) or so but nevertheless was a landmark.

“Five months later K.13, on trials in the Gareloch, dived with an engine induction valve open. 29 men in the after part of the submarine were drowned at once, but 48 in the forward compartments were saved by the bulkheads. Two men in the after compartments who attempted to emulate Stoker PO Brown were drowned.  Two officers attempted to reach the surface through the conning tower to summon help, one was drowned but the other succeeded in getting the hatch open and ascending in a bubble of air. In the sheltered waters of the Gareloch in a depth of only 38 feet (11.58 metres) divers were able to connect an air supply through an ammunition hoist to keep the survivors alive. The whole recourses of the Clyde were then applied to salvage and after two days, one end of K.13 was raised to the surface and 46 men were rescued. 

“Salvage as a method of submarine rescue therefore gained immensely in prestige, and after the war it remained the primary method of rescuing survivors from a submarine accidents. In none of these four accidents was salvage effective, in two cases because the water was far too deep for salvage even to be attempted and in others because the whole crew were drowned at once after a collision. In any case, all four submarines were sunk in water deep enough to collapse the bulkheads. In these four accidents from which there was not a single survivor, collision while submerged was responsible for three of them (H.42, L.24, M.1) and the fourth was a submarine accident (K.5).

“Although the salvage policy was singularly ineffective in saving anyone, it is true to say that it is unlikely that there would have been any survivors even if Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus had been fitted. However, after the M.1 disaster in 1925, much attention was given to methods of individual escape as an alternative to salvage. The US of A had already produced the Momsen Lung for this purpose and the Germans had had Daeger gear as early as World War 1. There was always the possibility of reviving the old Hall Rees gear.

“At the time efforts were redoubled to try and make salvage effective and, taking a lesson from K.13, it was directed to raising one end of the submarine and provide air connections to keep the crew alive while this was being done. All ideas of salvage in water deeper than 20 fathoms at which the bulkheads would go were given up.

“In 1929 trials were carried out with various types of breathing apparatus and the Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus  (DSEA) was adjudged to be far superior to the other competitors and so it was decided to adopt it and issue it to submarines. Trials to find the best way to open the submarine hatch in order to escape were also instituted. In 1930 the installation of the DSEA on the scale of one per man to all submarines was begun.

“In the interim period three more accidents occurred, H.47, Poseidon and M.2. Two collisions on the surface and one submarine accident. Two of these accidents had a very decided influence on escape policy.

“Poseidon collided while on the surface with the Chinese steamer Yuta on 9 June 1931 and sank in about 20 fathoms. 27 men escaped by the conning tower before she sank, but twenty-six were trapped in the submarine. Eight of these in the fore ends were saved by the bulkheads, but 18 in the after ends were drowned. “Poseidon was however the first submarine accident in which men escaped using DSEA and it was concluded that it was perfectly efficient if used correctly. The need for better training was obvious and DSEA training tanks were ordered to be built at Malta and Hong Kong as well as that existing at Fort Blockhouse. To reduce the chance of ‘bends’ it was necessary to make provision to flood up more rapidly so that the men would be under pressure in the submarine for a shorter time before escaping. Special valves were therefore fitted to submarines. It was clear that the arrangements for opening the hatch were most unsatisfactory and it was decided to fit twill trunks and special escape hatches. The twill trunk has the effect of making it possible to equalize the pressure and open the hatch without a large bubble going out, letting it slam down again. Men can stand with their heads in air while awaiting to escape and can then dip under the twill trunk and escape through the hatch. As one man in the fore ends of Poseidon had no DSEAA set, the scale of issue was increased to one and 1/3 times the crew dispersed throughout the submarine.

“M.2 sunk while carrying out submerged exercises in West Bay. The exact cause of the loss is unknown but she was equipped to carry a small sea-plane and it is believed to have flooded through the hanger door. M.2 was fitted with DSEA but no escapes were made. The submarine was not found for some days. Obviously it is essential to be able to find a lost submarine as quickly as possible and so indicator buoys, one at each end, were fitted to all submarines. These buoys could be released by the crew to mark the submarines position. Salvage operations were put in hand on M.2 mainly with the object of finding out what had gone wrong. After ten months of hard work the stern was raised above the surface. It slipped backed at once and salvage was then abandoned.

“It was therefore abundantly clear from the lessons of M.2 that salvage for the purpose of saving lives was hopeless and the Poseidon accident showed that individual escape by DSEA gave a better chance. In 1932/33 the whole business of submarine escape was most carefully reconsidered and salvage as a method of rescue was finally abandoned. The DSEA was now to be relied on entirely to save life after an accident and as I have already indicated, measures were taken to improve its chances of success as a result of the experience gained in Poseidon.

 “For new construction submarines it was decided to strengthen the bulkheads to make escape possible down to 200 feet (61 metres) or so and to fit two-man escape chambers at each end of the submarine which were considered to give a better chance of escape than the twill trunk. In the two-man escape chamber men could escape in pairs with a very short flooding time and would not be subjected to pressure and flooding until their turn came to escape.                 

“In the early thirties, salvage was finally abandoned as a method of escape and all submarines were fitted with DSEA on a scale one and 1/3 times the size of the crew. The twill trunk escape hatch was fitted at each end, as were indicator buoys. That has been, with many improvements, the escape equipment in use in our submarines right up to the present day (1956 Ed).

“On 3 January 1939, Thetis sank on trials after flooding through a torpedo tube in Liverpool Bay. Thetis had a two-man escape chamber at each end of the submarine and no twill trunks. The two forward compartments were flooded, but the whole of the crew and passengers numbering 103 escaped immediate drowning and retreated into the after compartments. It had been laid down that escape should not be started until it was known that ships were there to pick up survivors. Thetis was not found and therefore no ships arrived for 17 hours and during this time the survivors did their best to surface the submarine. Eventually they succeeded in bringing the stern above water. By this time with the very large number of men on board and the hard work they had been doing, the air was very foul. As an example one officer stated that by the time he had climbed up the steep incline to the stern of the submarine he was so exhausted that he had to rest for 10-15 minutes before he had the energy to put on a DSEA set. Two men then escaped without difficulty from the after escape chamber using DSEA. It must have appeared now to the survivors that unless they got a move on they would die first, so they made the fatal mistake of trying to get four men into the two-man chamber. After a quarter of an hour, three were dead and one nearly so. The discouraging effect of this accident can be imagined. However two more men escaped with DSEA but no-one else ever came out and the stern sank again shortly afterwards

“There is little doubt that the rest of the crew succumbed to CO2 poisoning and died. From this it was obvious that in the future, escapes must begin much sooner and on no account should matters be left so late. This drew attention to the great importance of finding the submarine quickly so that escapes could start. The Thetis disaster shook everyone’s confidence in the DSEA. Here was a submarine sunk in only 150 feet (45.7 meters) of water and fitted with the latest two man escape chambers but from which there were fewer survivors than in the Poseidon eight years before. Furthermore, the appearance of the stern above water made Admiralty wonder whether they had been right to abandon salvage. The Admiralty therefore appointed a high-power committee under Admiral Nasmith to review the whole question of submarine escape and whether we had been right to abandon any idea of salvage.

“The Nasmith Committee confirmed that salvage was rightly abandoned and that, had the crew really understood the physiology of escape they should all have been saved without difficulty; it was the delay that had been fatal.

“The Nasmith Committee therefore stressed the need for more training and recommended the construction of a 100 foot (30.4 meters) training tank. They also recommended that the two-man escape chamber be abandoned and that the twill trunk should be fitted in all future submarines. They admitted that the two-man escape gave a better chance of escape under certain conditions but considered that it was too complicated and took too long to get the whole crew out. The twill trunk method on the other hand was simple and the men were under leadership for much longer. The Nasmith Committee also set in train a very important series of physiological experiments; a sub-committee being appointed for this purpose. Their first discovery was that CO2 poisoning set in much sooner under pressure. A concentration of CO2 that was permissible at atmospheric pressure was likely to be lethal when the air was compressed ready to escape. This emphasized the need for still faster flooding and the Nasmith Committee advocated releasing and compressed air left in the submarine while flooding up, to speed up the process and freshen the air. The need to escape early was made more important than ever by these experiments as the atmosphere in a submarine after ten hours dived was found to be sufficiently foul to be lethal on flooding up in 150 feet (45.7 meters) Most of the recommendations of the Nasmith Committee were implemented although World War II had started and effort was concentrated on winning the war.

“During World War II, among the 77 submarines lost in all, were four that could be classified as accidents. In 1940, Unity was lost after colliding with a merchant vessel in fog while on the surface. Most of the crew escaped before she sank, but two were carried down with her and two were drowned before they could be rescued. In 1941, Umpire was also lost after a collision on the surface. Some escaped before the submarine sank but 21 were taken down inside the unflooded compartments. All 21 made successful escapes from the twill trunk or the conning tower with only 14 DSEA sets between them – of these, six were subsequently drowned before they were picked up. 

“Early in 1943, Vandal disappeared while on independent exercise in Inchmarnoch water with all hands. The cause of this loss is unknown and the wreck has never been found

“A few months later Untamed sank while exercising submerged off Campbelltown due to flooding through the patent log sluice which had been dismantled in error to effect repairs. The whole crew retreated to the engine room and shut the watertight door. Unfortunately the flood valve was defective and so they had to flood through the engines. Valves were; however, open to the after compartment as well which allowed up the rate of flooding still further and this, coupled with the depth of 153 feet (46.6 meters) killed the whole crew by CO2 poisoning before they could escape, confirming the physiological predictions of the Nasmith Committee.

“At the end of the war, the Admiralty appointed another committee under Rear Admiral Ruck Keen to enquire anew into the whole question of submarine escape and rescue. This committee interviewed a considerable number of men of various nationalities who had escaped from submarines during World War II. Their findings were of the greatest importance and were:-

(a)              That the main hazard is not the ascent from the sunken submarine, but the period inside the submarine before escaping, especially during flooding up. Three quarters of the casualties in an accident occurred during this time.

(b)              That as many men escaped during the war making “free ascents” without any apparatus at all as with any form of breathing apparatus.

“They, in turn recommended that twill trunks should be abolished and that a special one-man escape chamber be used instead and that “free ascent” should replace ascent by DSEA. I will merely remark that, provided you take a deep breath before leaving the submarine, it will last you all the way up to the surface. To ensure that you do go up to the surface a life-jacket is worn. Indeed, the volume of air in your lungs at 100 feet (30.4 metres) is three times or so what it is on the surface, all the way up it is therefore essential to breathe out hard to get rid of the surplus. Free ascent is far simpler than any kind of breathing apparatus and training has now started in earnest. 

“The One-man escape Chamber is also installed in the 100 foot (30.4 meters) tank. The theory is that it is possible to flood it up very quickly with purified air and so give the best chance of survival against bends or CO2 poisoning without introducing the danger of oxygen poisoning. To overcome the objection to the Thetis type of chamber it is operated from inside the submarine and the escaper has nothing to do except breath out when the hatch opens the escaper can be pushed out with a piston. The One Man Escape Chamber gives a better chance of escape than any other method of individual escape. It is hoped that it will be satisfactory down to 300 feet (91.4 meters) but the chance of survival at this depth is probably no better than even. The One-Man Escape chamber is now being fitted in HMS Solent in Portsmouth Dockyard for further trails at sea. All new construction submarines will have one at each end.

“In 1949 FOSM pointed out that, as no individual escapes even with the One-Man Escape Chamber would be effective over 300 feet (91.4 meters), there was a strong case to adopt the US Rescue Bell, and to strengthen new construction bulkheads up to the same strength as the pressure hull. Escapes would then be possible down to the full diving depth of the submarine.

“A US Rescue Bell was therefore obtained from the USN under the Mutual Defence Aid Pack and trials have demonstrated it to be suitable for use in British waters where tides and weather are formidable. The ocean salvage vessel Kingsalver has been altered to take the bell and the complicated gear that is necessary for mooring over a sunken submarine in deep waters and has been renamed Kingfisher. The final trials are to begin in the Clyde.

“Since the Ruck Keene Report there have been two more submarine disasters and a careful review of escape measures by FOSM and the Admiralty.

“The loss of Truculent on 12 January 1950, in a collision with SS Dvina, trapped some fifty to sixty men in the engine room. No doubt remembering the Thetis, the decision was made to escape at once and both the after ends and the engine room were flooded up and everyone escaped by the twill trunk method, half using DSEA and half with no sets. Only ten men were, however, rescued and the rest were swept out to sea by the strong ebb tide and drowned. Thus is demonstrated the great difficulty of issuing instructions which are simple and yet applicable to all occasions. The Truculent disaster confirmed that in shallow water (68 feet 20.7 meters) and with air fresh, the twill trunk escape, with or without Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus, is quite efficient. It also showed the need for 100% escape gear at each end as it is quite possible for the whole crew to retreat to one end or the other. It drew attention to the need to provide some measures to keep men alive in the water after they have escaped. Some of Truculent survivors probably drowned because they had no DSEA set to act as a lifebelt, but others undoubtedly died of exposure. Immersion suits to keep men alive in the water are now in service in all submarines.

“Very little is known about how Affray was lost, but indications are that the crew were overcome very quickly. No indicator buoys were released and it is clear that no attempt was made to escape. The loss of Affray did, however, draw attention again to the problem of finding a submarine after an accident. Although it would not have helped Affray, indicator buoys are now of an improved pattern and have flashing lights and an indicator buoy with a wireless set with which to summon assistance is now undergoing trial.

“The Ruck Keene committee recommended a mixture breathing set to replace the DSEA in existing submarines for use with twill trunks during the flooding-up period, as existing submarines have no room for the One Man Escape Chamber. This would protect the survivors against CO2 poisoning while flooding-up with much less chance of giving them oxygen poisoning than when breathing the pure oxygen in the DSEA or giving them the “bends” if an apparatus using fresh ordinary air were used. Such a set, the Submarine Escape Breathing Apparatus has been developed. It has, however, been found impossible to two 100% of these sets at each end of the submarine, and so a new system known as the Built In Breathing System has been designed instead. It consists of large bottles of mixture as (40% oxygen 60% nitrogen) built into the submarine and a tube and mouthpiece for each man at each end of the submarine. The men will breathe from this system while flooding up, the time of which has been still further cut down by extra flood valves, and then make a “free ascent” through hatches fitted with twill trunks.

 “The Built In Breathing System has passed tests in the 100 foot tank and is now fitted for sea trials in HMS Sleuth.

“To summarise, therefore, the policy for escape gear in New Construction submarines is to fit strong bulkheads to stand the full diving pressure of the submarine and to fit them to take the rescue bell at either end. They will also be fitted with air supply and exhaust connections at both ends to enable the air to be refreshed while the rescue bell is arriving and in case operations have to be suspended due to rough weather. This will give a chance to escape down to the full diving depth of the submarine. It will, however, only be used in peacetime.

“They will also be fitted with a One Man Escape Chamber at each end of the submarine which will enable escapes to be made down to 300 feet (91.4 meters) without outside assistance. As I said before, however, a considerable proportion of casualties are likely at this depth. Once the One-Man Escape Chamber has been accepted for service, only Immersion Suits will be carried and there will be no need for the Built In Breather System, the Submarine Escape Breathing Apparatus or the DSEA.

“They will also be fitted with radio indicator buoys, underwater telephones and underwater signal ejectors for firing smoke candles from each end of the submarine, and many other devices, all duplicated at each end of the submarine.

“In the existing submarines it has been decided that the fitting of the rescue bell is not justified as the bulkheads will not stand much more than 200 feet (60.9 meters) at which both individual escape is practicable and should be successful. Twill trunks, but with more rapid flood valves and the Built In Breathing System, will be used by “free Accent” in immersion suits. Once the built In Breathing System is accepted for service the DSEA will be landed. Underwater telephones, radio indicator buoys etc will be fitted.

“Well, Gentlemen, you will see that very substantial changes are about to take place in the Submarine Escape Policy and much new equipment and methods are about to come into service. The price in complexity and weight in the submarine is very large and the inroads into the military characteristics are serious. However the One-Man Escape Chamber and the Built In Breathing System will also be of use in war, unfortunately the rescue Bell, except during trials etc, will not. 

“Before closing the lecture I would like to add a note of warning. No submarine Accident, as I hope this lecture has shown, is like the last and it is extremely difficult to foresee every contingency. A submarine equipped with these new systems may well be flooded throughout when the accident occurs or be in deep water where no escape equipment will avail. The best escape policy for submarines in the future is still the same as fifty years ago – good drill, good maintenance and attention to sound practice.”                                  

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THE LOSS OF HMS SIDON by Geoff MARSHALL

On 16 June 1955 the ‘S’ class submarine HMS Sidon, commanded by LCDR I.T. Verry RN, was due to depart for a live torpedo firing exercise. She was based at Portland using HMS Maidstone as her depot ship. All her hatches were shut except for the hatch of the conning tower.

The torpedoes due to be test-fired were Mk 12 (AKA Fancy). These torpedoes were converted Mk 8s equipped with an HTP (high test peroxide) motor. This was based on the German Stienbutt torpedo produced at the end of World War II. Several had been captured in 1945 and their performance had impressed the Royal Navy. Many Mk 8s remained in stock and it was obviously cheaper to convert these than to build new torpedoes designed from the ground up around an HTP motor. Unfortunately, although this decision made economic sense, technically it was to prove disastrous. HTP was highly volatile and the Mk 8s contained materials that reacted with it. At 0825 an explosion occurred while the Mk 12 was in Sidon’s No. 3 torpedo rube. The force of the blast blew off the bow cap of the torpedo tube and the tube’s rear door. Seawater flooded through the tube into the compartment.  With her watertight doors open the submarine flooded and sank in the harbour. The explosion killed 12 of the crew.

Sidon’s CO ordered the after and DSEA hatches opened and ordered the Engineer Officer and the First Lieutenant to go below to carry out a damage assessment. The First Lieutenant failed to hear the order and proceeded below later. Many of Sidon’s crew were dazed and confused after the explosion, but they were evacuated in an orderly manner. No crew member that was aft of the Wardroom when the explosion occurred was killed. Verry went below wearing breathing apparatus to carry out a damage assessment. He could make no progress going forward because the bulkhead doors were jammed. He therefore returned to the bridge. 

Maidstone sent over fire-fighting equipment and breathing apparatus. A rescue party from Maidstone also went across.

Commander Submarines realised that Sidon was sinking and shouted the order to abandon ship across to LCDR Verry. Verry then passed on the order down the conning-tower hatch. When everyone was believed to be clear an attempt was made to close the after hatch, but it proved impossible to do. It was therefore not possible to seal off the submarine. Water was now flooding into Sidon and she came to rest in 36 feet of water at the bottom of Portland harbour with a list of 25 degrees to starboard.

LCDR Verry was the last member of Sidon’s crew to abandon the submarine. Three officers and ten men were killed as result of the explosion and sinking.

Maidstone’s surgeon, LEUT C.E. Rhodes RNVR was among those killed. He had boarded Sidon after the initial explosion to render medical assistance and was killed when the submarine sank.

The lifting lighter Moordale was passing Sidon’s location at the time she sank and tried to pass a line around Sidon’s stern to prevent it from sinking, this attempt was unsuccessful.

The signal “SUBSUNK” was sent and a party of divers despatched to Portland by helicopter. It was found that Sidon had settled on a more even keel and an attempt was made to salvage her. Divers had worked through the night to attach high-pressure air hoses to her hull, owing to air leaks this attempt failed. The divers also tried to make the submarine ready for the attempt to lift her.

Two Admiralty salvage vessels, Kinbrace and Swin arrived from Dover along with the Portsmouth based Barfloss to take part in the salvage operation. The salvage team attached 4 camels (2 each side of the wreck). These camels were basically hollow steel tubes that were naturally buoyant. They were flooded with water to make them sink, attached to the sides of the wreck and pumped out. Their natural buoyancy would return, therefore rising to the surface and bringing the wreck of Sidon with it.

On 23 June 1955, Sidon was raised from the seabed of Portland Harbour in the early hours of the morning under the light of floodlights. She remained alongside of the depot ship for another day before being towed away; this had been accomplished by 27 June.                      

The bodies of those killed in the disaster were buried in the Naval Cemetery that overlooks Portland Harbour and Weymouth Bay.

The board of inquiry attached no blame for the disaster on LCDR Verry. The accident signalled the end of the Mk 12 programme and the end of research into HTP fuelled torpedoes.

On 2 July 1955 Sidon was officially paid off and de-stored pending a survey and a decision on her future.

On 14 June 1957 Sidon was deliberately sunk for use as an asdic target 15 miles off Weymouth, she lies there today at a depth of 35 metres below the surface.

 CASUALTIES: Discharged Dead from Sidon on 16 June 1955 following the torpedo explosion.

LCDR Jerold Keith Needham RN

LEUT Julian Miles Wemyss Rycrof RN

Surgeon LEUT Charles Eric Rhodes AM RNVR

PO Laverne Donald McLeod RCN

LS David George Davies

AB John Reginald Ford

AB Donald Peter Waite

Tel. Charles Duke Clayton

ME1 Ronald Henry Peale

Cook Philip John William Rice

Stwd. John Robert Sunderland

L Cook Colin Smith

LS Peter Richard Anthony Dorey

For those wondering what the AM is after LEUT Rhodes’ name, it stands for Albert Medal. Ed.

As with every disaster there are the quiet achievers and unsung heroes. The following article was taken for “The World” dated 19 June 1955.