TAKE COVER

Have you got the necessary protection for your assets?

 The following information was supplied by the Military Police Association of Australia to make former and serving military personnel aware of the significant value of their honours and awards. Not only do they have high sentimental value to the recipient and their families etc, they have in most instances great value to boot.

Therefore some serious consideration should be given to the fact that they are a substantial asset within the household when considering house and contents insurance.  The inclusion of medals as a SPECIAL ITEM is most often overlooked

Below is a brief list of the more common medals awarded to Australian Service Men and Women and their current value. Food for thought and you can quickly do the sums. 

Top end value relates to a medal in its original box untouched and unmounted.  Bottom end value relates to a medal in very poor condition with no ribbon or mounting.

The author of this information states that 90% of the medals that pass through his hands ARE at the top end of this scale. Some groups of the medals depending on the uniqueness can be valued higher again.

The following list is the “Name of the Medal”, Bottom End Value and Top End Value.

RUSSIA ACCEPTS RIMPAC 08 INVITATION

Russia has accepted an invitation to participate in this year’s Rim of the Pacific naval exercises ADML Robert Willard USN, commander of the US Pacific Fleeted, stated at the 7^th annual Hawaii-US Military Partnership Conference on 3 January 2008. “Whether that will continue to hold, given the political dynamic association with Russian military and ours and our various administrations will remain to be seen,” Willard Said, “but they showed up at the mid-planning conference (in November 07) with an expectation to actually participate this year. That is great progress.”

RIMPAC is a biennial, multinational exercise held in Hawaiian waters. Russia was invited to observe the 2004 and 2006 RIMPAC exercises but did not send observers. “Russia is a member of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, and Russian participation in RIMPAC would further US Maritime Strategy objectives of the developing collaborative partnerships and strengthening collective security,” Pacific Fleet spokesman Mark Matsunaga said.

“Working together with partners in the Pacific builds confidence and trust to allow the partners to focus on common threats, combat trans-national crime, strengthen maritime security and achieve mutual interests,” Matsunaga said

China has not been invited to participate or observe RIMPAC 08. The US National Defence Authorisation Act of 2000 precludes direct military-to-military contacts with China, except for search-and-rescue and humanitarian assistance operations.

A small Chinese contingent did observe RIMPAC in 1998, before that law was passed.  In 2006, a waiver to the restrictions allowed a Chinese team to observe a portion of the Valiant Shield exercise off Guam. However, there are no plans to invite China as a participant or observer for RIMPAC 2008.

From “The Navy”- The Magazine of the Navy League of Australia, Volume 70 No2, April-June 2008.

   Editor’s Comment:

Well, finally the Russians have been formally invited to participate in RIMPAC exercises!

In 1971, HMAS Onslow was one of five RAN platforms, which included the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne and destroyers Hobart, Torrens and Yarra to sail to Hawaii to participate in the very first RIMPAC.

At this time I was undertaking my ‘Part Three’ and I was learning the rudiments of the sonar sets in the sound lounge; my Sea Daddy at the time was Killick UC Jock Copeland.  During the ‘first watch’ Jock had me sit at one of the sets (now forgotten which one) and listen for unusual marine sounds/noises, he had plugged into the set and described what I was listening to and what I had to ignore, they being the usual fish sounds etc, my job was to listen up and down the frequency and report anything unusual to him. I had been doing this for a while during our watch, when all of a sudden a loud thrashing noise assaulted my ears, I called Jock over, and he plugged in and listened, then reported to the CO, LCDR Paddy Ryan RN that we had picked up a nuclear submarine contact in fairly close quarters.  On giving the coordinates our CO brought the boat to periscope depth and began to scan the surface for our noise source. In the distance the CO spotted a large fishing trawler and decided that this was the source of our noise.

Well, with that, we were disappointed that our discovery was relegated to a surface ship and thought nothing more of the noise source. That was until the following day when we surfaced and took onboard various UC ranks from a New Zealand destroyer who had come to look over a working submarine. Jock, who was on watch with me in tow, was delegated to give the Kiwis a tour through the boat, we had started our tour in the fore-ends and by the time we got to outside the galley one of the UCs stated, “Did you pick up that Russian submarine last night.” Jock surprised, said “Come with me” and took the group straight to the CO’s cabin and after knocking and receiving an answer, Jock told the UC to repeat what he had said to him to our CO. After listening to the UC, our CO stated, “Oh well, too bad now.” Jock replied, “No it is not, I recorded the noise source.” On the boat’s return to Pearl Harbour, Jock went ashore and had the USN analyse the tape, we were informed that it was definitely a Russian nuclear submarine. So it appears that the Russian Navy have probably attended every RIMPAC exercise unofficially since day one. Ed.         

SUBMARINE ACCIDENTS AND ESCAPES

The following is a lecture given circa 1955/6, I suspect it was written and given by Captain George Hunt. It was found in the Michael White research material kept in the Submarine Collection on Spectacle Island.

This lecture deals with the ‘S’, ‘T’, ‘A’ class, Excalibur and Explorer submarines that were in commission at the time. Some of the changes to assist submarine escape mentioned at the end of the lecture would be incorporated in the ‘P’ class being built at the time; of course, submariners who served in the next class, the Oberons, would recognise the escape systems then being planned.

If any member who was an escape coxswain would like to finish the history of escape from where this story ends to the present day to refect the changes of the passed 50 years, I will be happy to publish your work.   

Some sections of this lecture have been updated to reflect the difference of fifty odd years. Ed.

“The first British submarine accident occurred just over 104 years ago in March 1904 when A.1 was rammed while submerged by the SS Berwick Castle off the Nab and sank with the loss of all hands. Between this date and the beginning of the First World War a further five accidents occurred. Two of these accidents were caused by submarines being run down by a ship while submerged; two collided with ships while on the surface and were holed and sank, and two were what might be called submarine accidents in which some failure of the men or material let in the sea. All subsequent submarine accidents have also been attributable to one of these three causes. In all six of these pre-World War 1 accidents practically the whole crew were drowned instantly, the only survivors being those who floated off before the submarine sank.

“Salvage was practicable with such small vessels and indeed four out of six submarines were salved in periods varying 4 days to five weeks. After the loss of A.1, therefore, the official escape policy was to try and salvage the submarine and save the crew. In no case was anybody saved by salvage, and, indeed the chance of saving anyone was remote, as the submarines had no bulkheads and were generally flooded throughout as soon as the accident occurred. The most important contributions to submarine safety lay in the material and other lessons learnt which made accidents in the future less likely. For instance after A.1, a lower hatch was fitted at the bottom of the conning tower. In a subsequent similar collision in which A.9 was involved, the submarine was undoubtedly saved by this modification, this lesson has not been lost sight of and all present day submarines have a lower conning tower hatch and whenever any valve or service passes through the hull, its integrity is always ensued by a valve. A no less important contribution to submarine safety was the knowledge that the only hope of survival was not to have an accident. The submarine service thus built up its reputation for meticulous care in everything to do with the operation of the submarine and for the methodical checking and maintenance of all equipment. Such a tradition is likely to save far more lives than any number of interlocks and escape equipment.

“In 1912 or thereabouts, the first practical steps to save life after a submarine disaster was taken in the design of the ‘E’ Class. Her bulkheads were fitted for the first time to divide the submarine into several watertight compartments. After an accident only one compartment was expected to be flooded and it was hoped that some survivors would still be alive in the un-flooded compartments. There would be some point in attempting to salvage them to save them. Two years later, in 1914, the first ideas that it might be possible for survivors to make an escape from a  submarine as apposed to the submarine being salved to save them took the practical form in the issue of the Hall Rees apparatus. This was bulky self-contained breathing set, with a helmet the size of a diver’s suit. Only one was carried in each submarine and it was to be used to escape from the conning tower. This apparatus was landed after two years as being too cumbersome and complicated and dangerous to use. It is of interest however as it was the ancestor of the Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus.

“Bulkheads saved the first man in August, 1916, when E.4 and E.41 collided during exercises and both sunk. In E.41 most of the crew escaped up the conning tower before she sank but a Stoker Petty Officer Brown was trapped in the engine room. He had no escape gear and his main problem was to get the hatch open and hope to float to the surface. It is not perhaps generally appreciated that even at the shallow depth of 30 feet (9.14 metres) at which E.41 lay, the sea pressure exerts a force of some seven tons on a hatch holding it tight shut. There is never the remotest possibility of opening it by brute strength. The only way is to let the sea into the compartment and flood it up so that the pressure is the same on both sides of the hatch. It can then be opened quiet easily. Stoker Petty Officer Brown did this and succeeded in opening the hatch. Every time he did so however, a bubble of air went out, the pressure in the compartment propped and the hatch slammed down again, on one occasion on his hand.  He then had to flood up again to balance the pressure. After the third try the compartment was completely flooded but the hatch stayed open and then taking a deep breath, he floated to the surface. This was the first escape in the Royal Navy from a submerged submarine. It was only from 30 feet (9.14 metres) or so but nevertheless was a landmark.

“Five months later K.13, on trials in the Gareloch, dived with an engine induction valve open. 29 men in the after part of the submarine were drowned at once, but 48 in the forward compartments were saved by the bulkheads. Two men in the after compartments who attempted to emulate Stoker PO Brown were drowned.  Two officers attempted to reach the surface through the conning tower to summon help, one was drowned but the other succeeded in getting the hatch open and ascending in a bubble of air. In the sheltered waters of the Gareloch in a depth of only 38 feet (11.58 metres) divers were able to connect an air supply through an ammunition hoist to keep the survivors alive. The whole recourses of the Clyde were then applied to salvage and after two days, one end of K.13 was raised to the surface and 46 men were rescued. 

“Salvage as a method of submarine rescue therefore gained immensely in prestige, and after the war it remained the primary method of rescuing survivors from a submarine accidents. In none of these four accidents was salvage effective, in two cases because the water was far too deep for salvage even to be attempted and in others because the whole crew were drowned at once after a collision. In any case, all four submarines were sunk in water deep enough to collapse the bulkheads. In these four accidents from which there was not a single survivor, collision while submerged was responsible for three of them (H.42, L.24, M.1) and the fourth was a submarine accident (K.5).

“Although the salvage policy was singularly ineffective in saving anyone, it is true to say that it is unlikely that there would have been any survivors even if Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus had been fitted. However, after the M.1 disaster in 1925, much attention was given to methods of individual escape as an alternative to salvage. The US of A had already produced the Momsen Lung for this purpose and the Germans had had Daeger gear as early as World War 1. There was always the possibility of reviving the old Hall Rees gear.

“At the time efforts were redoubled to try and make salvage effective and, taking a lesson from K.13, it was directed to raising one end of the submarine and provide air connections to keep the crew alive while this was being done. All ideas of salvage in water deeper than 20 fathoms at which the bulkheads would go were given up.

“In 1929 trials were carried out with various types of breathing apparatus and the Davis Submarine Escape Apparatus  (DSEA) was adjudged to be far superior to the other competitors and so it was decided to adopt it and issue it to submarines. Trials to find the best way to open the submarine hatch in order to escape were also instituted. In 1930 the installation of the DSEA on the scale of one per man to all submarines was begun.

“In the interim period three more accidents occurred, H.47, Poseidon and M.2. Two collisions on the surface and one submarine accident. Two of these accidents had a very decided influence on escape policy.

“Poseidon collided while on the surface with the Chinese steamer Yuta on 9 June 1931 and sank in about 20 fathoms. 27 men escaped by the conning tower before she sank, but twenty-six were trapped in the submarine. Eight of these in the fore ends were saved by the bulkheads, but 18 in the after ends were drowned. “Poseidon was however the first submarine accident in which men escaped using DSEA and it was concluded that it was perfectly efficient if used correctly. The need for better training was obvious and DSEA training tanks were ordered to be built at Malta and Hong Kong as well as that existing at Fort Blockhouse. To reduce the chance of ‘bends’ it was necessary to make provision to flood up more rapidly so that the men would be under pressure in the submarine for a shorter time before escaping. Special valves were therefore fitted to submarines. It was clear that the arrangements for opening the hatch were most unsatisfactory and it was decided to fit twill trunks and special escape hatches. The twill trunk has the effect of making it possible to equalize the pressure and open the hatch without a large bubble going out, letting it slam down again. Men can stand with their heads in air while awaiting to escape and can then dip under the twill trunk and escape through the hatch. As one man in the fore ends of Poseidon had no DSEAA set, the scale of issue was increased to one and 1/3 times the crew dispersed throughout the submarine.

“M.2 sunk while carrying out submerged exercises in West Bay. The exact cause of the loss is unknown but she was equipped to carry a small sea-plane and it is believed to have flooded through the hanger door. M.2 was fitted with DSEA but no escapes were made. The submarine was not found for some days. Obviously it is essential to be able to find a lost submarine as quickly as possible and so indicator buoys, one at each end, were fitted to all submarines. These buoys could be released by the crew to mark the submarines position. Salvage operations were put in hand on M.2 mainly with the object of finding out what had gone wrong. After ten months of hard work the stern was raised above the surface. It slipped backed at once and salvage was then abandoned.

“It was therefore abundantly clear from the lessons of M.2 that salvage for the purpose of saving lives was hopeless and the Poseidon accident showed that individual escape by DSEA gave a better chance. In 1932/33 the whole business of submarine escape was most