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THE LOSS OF HMS UNITY 

In the November 2008 of “In Depth” Captain George Hunt, in his correspondence to the Editor mentioned that he was a survivor of the sinking of submarine HMS Unity in 1940. His comment got my interest going, so I did some research on her loss. The following is from the book “Beneath the Waves – A History of HM Submarine Losses 1904 – 1971” by A. S. Evans, ISBN 0-7183-0601-5. This story deals only with the loss and the subsequent inquiry, other than what is mentioned, Captain Hunt’s involvement and his escape with burst eardrums is his own personal story. Ed.

“Day after day, by sea and by air, the German build up of men and material in Norway continued unabated. To help Norway in her struggle against the Nazi war machine, Allied troops had by 15 April made landings in northern Norway. With British and Norwegians fighting side by side, it was ironic that it should have been a Norwegian freighter that sunk HM Submarine Unity in a collision which claimed the lives of four submariners.

 “At 1730 on the evening of Monday, 29 April, Unity (Lieutenant F.J. Brooks) put to sea from Blyth. Visibility on leaving harbour was 300 yards. By the time Unity entered the main swept channel, which she did at 1830; visibility had reduced to a hundred yards owing to a heavy mist closing in further. At 1900, Lieutenant G. E. Hunt made an appearance on the bridge to relieve the officer on watch, Lieutenant J.F. Trickey; however, as the OOW was hoping to sight a war channel buoy, Hunt did not take over the watch at once but assisted as a lookout in the search for the buoy.

 “Earlier that day the Norwegian freighter Atle Jarl had sailed from the Scottish port of Methil, which lies snugly on the north shore of the Firth of Fourth, with a cargo of coal and coke. In convoy the Atle Jarl headed south for the Tyne and for her chance encounter with Unity.

“At the time Lieutenant Hunt arrived on Unity’s bridge to take over the watch, the submarine and Atle Jarl (sixth ship of the convoy) were close proximity to each other, though neither vessel was aware of this as darkness and the fog had successfully shielded all movement. At 1907 a prolong blast of a ship’s siren was heard on Unity’s bridge. Ordering a long blast in reply, Lieutenant Brooks put the wheel hard to starboard. The submarine was still swinging to starboard when the blast of another siren was heard fine on the starboard bow. On hearing this second siren, Brooks ordered the wheel midships and the engines to full speed astern. Leading Telegraphist Peter Birnie immediately operated the bridge telegraph to FULL SPEED ASTERN, hearing at the same time Lieutenant Brooks order the watertight doors to be shut. At that moment the Atle Jarl, steering a course that would take her into collision with Unity, was sighted less than 50 yards away as she emerged from the fog. Unity sounded three blasts on her siren, to which the Norwegian replied likewise. It was apparent to Brooks that a collision was likely. Realising the danger Brooks gave the order: “Collision stations. Prepare to Abandon Ship.” At 1910 the Atle Jarl struck the submarine at a speed of 4 knots and at an angle of 90 degrees, in the vicinity of the port forward hydroplane. From reports it appears that the force of the collision was not heavy. Unity, going astern at 2 knots, listed very little on impact. When the two vessels drew apart it was evident to Brooks that Unity was not about to remain on the surface for long. The engines had been left working at full astern for as long as possible to assist Unity in staying afloat, but as the Atle Jarl vanished into the fog Brooks ordered them stopped.

“Leading Seaman William Hill, on duty in Unity’s engine room, states: “We were going astern for some time when I observed that Able Seaman Hare was attempting to shut the engine room bulkhead door. By motions to him and the engine room staff this was prevented till both engines were stopped. It was then carried out. We were still going astern when the first lieutenant opened the door and gave orders to abandon ship. Both of us, myself and Able Seaman Miller, made to move forward to obey that order. Miller had preceded me slightly when I received the order: “Stop starboard.” I went back and stopped starboard. Then I picked up two lifebelts and, throwing one lifebelt to Miller, left the boat.”        

 “Chief ERA Alfred Potter was in his mess when he felt the motors go full astern. He went to the control room: ‘Hearing the order “Shut watertight doors “I went to the engine room door to prevent it being shut before the engines were stopped,’ says Potter. ‘Able Seaman Hare was trying to shut it. When the engines were stopped I shut the engine room door, thinking it was a precautionary measure. I returned to the control room and found the first lieutenant by the ladder and the crew beginning to go up to the bridge. The first lieutenant said: “No hurry. There is only 3 feet showing on the diving gauges.” I did not hear “abandon ship” given. I then realised something was happening and went to my bunk to get my lifebelt. While I was putting this on, DSEA were being got out by the crew. When I left the control there were about six people left. There seemed to be no hurry. I did not feel any bump. When I got onto the bridge the bow of the submarine was awash.’

“Most of the crew had made their way topside and were crowded on the bridge. Because Unity had taken a bow-down angle, some of the crew were ordered off the bridge and towards the stern. Now to the experience of ERA Rob Roy McCurrach: ‘There was no panic; indeed, such a thing would have been unforgivable. Personally I thought the whole thing another exercise. As far as I can recall, I was the last but one up the ladder. Miller followed me. As I stepped out onto the packed conning tower I heard the captain say: “I must have the main motors stopped.” As I went to go down and do this, I almost trod on Miller’s head. “I’ll go, Bob. I’m better placed”, said Miller. He returned below. Then the captain wanted the bridge cleared a bit. I climbed down on to the casing and stood in my stocking-feet on the hull. I felt the vibration stop. As I slid into the water I wondered if I’d catch cold. Momentarily I thought I could do with a piece of my mother’s blackberry-and-apple pie. I then swam away from the boat. Turning, I waited to see if there would be some suction as she went down. There was none. When the motors stopped, she went down. Her stern rose high, water steaming from the props, hydroplanes and rudder. I stripped off a great deal of my clothing. I had no lifebelt. The crew were well spread out. Leading Seaman Hill was nearest to me so I swam to him. Just as we reached the top of a swell, we spotted a lifeboat. We made towards it, but they failed to see us and altered course. Most demoralizing that! When Hill and I finally managed to get to a lifeboat, the 3 men aboard were like zombies. Helped by Hill, I managed to get in. I then helped Bill. Between us we then pulled the captain in. I took an oar as we rowed about looking for survivors. I guess we were all in shock. When we went alongside Atle Jarl I grabbed the rope ladder at the top of a swell and made my way inboard and down to the boiler room, where I stripped and hung up my sodden clothes.’                      

“Unity had taken an angle of 25 degrees. When she sank four to five minutes after the collision, she took two of the crew with her Lieutenant John Low, the first lieutenant and Able Seaman Henry Miller.

“The submariners, who minutes earlier had been going quietly about their duties, had found themselves floundering in the cold North Sea with a convoy scattered around in the mist. The Atle Jarl had not strayed far from the scene. In half an hour all but two of the survivors had been rescued and transferred to Atle Jarl. At the request of Lieutenant Brooks, the freighter’s master agreed to remain in the vicinity for an hour and thirty minutes in the hope of rescuing the two missing crew, Able Seaman Hare and Stoker Shelton. Neither was recovered.

 “The conduct of his ship’s company in such trying circumstances gave Brooks cause for much satisfaction. In his report of the incident he singled out several of the ship’s company for special mention: Lieutenant J.F. Trickey for his assistance and encouragement of ratings in difficulties in the sea, particularly as Trickey was unable to swim more than a few yards; Lieutenant G.E. Hunt for his cheerfulness and efficiency during rescue, and later aboard Atle Jarl; Stoker Alfred Burvill for risking his life in attempting to rescue a drowning shipmate. Brooks was also generously disposed to mention the Norwegians for their promptness in dispatching two rescue boats and for their kindness over the hours that followed.    

“After survivors’ leaves, Unity’s crew was divided among HMS Upright and Utmost, both nearing completion at Vickers.

“It transpired that Lieutenant Brooks had been unaware that the Methil-Tyne convoy was at sea. This should not have been the case. Before sailing Blyth, Lieutenant Brooks should have received signal 1428/29/4 (2.28pm./20^th/April), which among other things would have informed him that the Methil-Tyne convoy was due off Blyth at about 1930. Brooks was certain that he had not been shown or told of this signal. Lieutenant Trickey, Lieutenant Hunt and Leading Signalman Moon, Unity’s signalman, all denied knowledge of signal 1428/29/4/. On the afternoon of 23 May a court of inquiry convened at Blyth to investigate the collision. Unity’s captain was summoned to give evidence.

 “Question: ‘Were you sending the usual signals for the prevention of collision at sea whilst you were underway?

    Lt Brooks: ‘No.’   

Question: ‘I take it, then, that the first sound signal you made was after hearing one long blast from the direction right ahead?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘Yes.’

Question: ‘Did you anticipate that the war channel would be clear of shipping?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘Yes, except small craft.’

Question: ‘Have you got any listening devices by which you can hear under water?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘Yes.’

Question: ‘Were these manned?’

    Lt Brooks: No sir.’

Question: ‘Would you tell the board, briefly, what these devices are?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘An A/S receiving set.’

Question: ‘Was it in working order?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘Yes.’

Question: ‘Is the set of any use, when running on the surface, for detecting the presence of any ship at reasonable distance?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘No, not with both engines running as the sound made by the engines muffles the reception of outside noise.’

Question: ‘In view of the very low visibility, what were you objections to running on the motors only, so that you could have made use of your A/S set?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘In view of the fact that the run up the swept channel was five hours’ duration I would not have been justified in exhausting my batteries at this time.’

Question ‘What was the state of the watertight doors on leaving Blyth?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘Fore-end doors shut. Remainder open.’

Question: ‘Were you in patrol routine?’

    Lt Brooks ‘Yes.’

Question: ‘According to Captains S6’s report, you had no knowledge of Commander-In-Chief’s Rosyth; signal timed 1428/29/4 indicating, among other things, that convoy Methil-Tyne was due off Blyth at about 1930?’         

    Lt Brooks: ‘No. I had no knowledge of this.’

Question: ‘Is there any statement you would like to make regarding you ignorance of the contents of this signal?’ 

    Lt Brooks: ‘Had I known of a southbound convoy was due I should have taken steps to keep out of its way.’

Question: ‘What steps would you have taken to avoid the convoy?’

    Lt Brooks: ‘I could have delayed my time of sailing, or proceeded outside the swept channel where practicable.’

Question: ‘Can you explain why this signal 1428/29/4 was not shown to you?’

    Lt Brooks; ‘My signalman, who should have collected the signal, and my navigating officer, who checks all signals shortly before sailing, both say they had not seen this signal.

Question: ‘With regard to the signal concerning the movements of the Methil-Tyne convoy: it seems clear that there must inevitably be certain space of time before the typing of your sailing orders and the moment of sailing – and during this time movement signals might be received . Therefore, what steps did you take to find out the latest information?’

Lt Brooks: ‘The movement of the ships likely to affect Unity on passage and patrol were contained in an appendix to the patrol orders. This appendix was completed shortly before sailing. I took this appendix into the staff office and went through it with the Staff Officer Operations. After this, as normal routine, I should have gone through any signals affecting me with the staff officer, and discuss it with him. As it was now practically time to sail, our discussion consisted of little more than going through the appendix and the question of convoy Methil-Tyne did not come up.”

 Question: ‘As the signal 1428/29/4 arrived before you sailed at 1730, can you give a reason for it not being shown to you?’

Lt Brooks: ‘No. It should have been collected by my signalman from the distributing office and shown to me. Had it arrived at the last moment, it should have been brought to the submarine by messenger just before sailing.’

“In an attempt to discover why signal 1428/29/4 had not been brought to the attention of Lieutenant Brooks, Chief Yeoman of Signals Christopher Reading, in charge of the DSO (Signal Distribution Office) of HMS Elfin, was called and asked if he could recall distributing to Unity signal 1428/29/4 from C-in-C Rosyth. The chief yeoman replied that the signalman on watch had distributed that signal and that he himself had no explanation as to why Unity had seemingly not received it. In answer to a question as to whether the signal had been received in the SDO in sufficient time to have been collected by Leading Signalman Moon, the chief yeoman stated that the signal had been received in ample time and there was no question of having to send it to Unity by special messenger. When asked if he remembered if anyone else had taken any signals for Unity that day, Reading answered that a Wren messenger had, and that she had taken them after Leading Signalman Moon had visited the SDO.

 “Signalman Walter Warren preformed his duties at the Signal Distribution Office. He had been summoned to the inquiry.            

Question: ‘Which watch were you keeping on 29 April, the day Unity sailed for patrol?’

    Sig. Warren: ‘I had the afternoon watch.’

Question: ‘Do you remember a signal 1428/29/4 being received from Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth, concerning the movements of certain ships and the Methil-Tyne convoy which was due off Blyth about 1930?’

    Sig. Warren: ‘Yes.’

Question: ‘Can you remember what the distribution of that signal was?’

    Sig. Warren: ‘Captain S, Commander S, Staff Officer Operations, Unity and Seal.”       

Question: ‘How was it distributed to HMS Unity?’

    Sig. Warren: ‘Unity has a distribution pigeon-hole and Unity’s signalman collects them at regular intervals.’

Question: ‘Can you remember whether this signal was still in Unity’s pigeon-hole and if so when?’

    Sig. Warren: ‘Not during the afternoon watch.’

Question: ‘Can you remember whether it was still in Unity’s pigeon-hole when you went off at four o’clock?’

    Sig. Warren: ‘It was in the pigeon-hole.

When Signalman Warren came off watch at the SDO, Telegraphist Percy Marks took Warren’s post at the office. Marks was asked if he could recall, on commencing his watch at four o’clock, whether there were any signals in Unity’s pigeon-hole. To this Marks replied that he was not sure.

Question: ‘Did any arrive whilst you were on watch?’

    Tel. Marks: “Yes. The first one was the one addressed to the Seal and Unity and I delivered that by hand to the leading signalman of Unity.’

Question: ‘What were the others?’

    Tel. Marks: ‘There were five or six QZHs (Signals relating to mines). The leading signalman went into the message room and came and said that they were coming through on the teleprinter. He said he could not wait, so I said I would get them off. Then I went into the message room and asked the teleprinter operator if she could hurry up with them because Seal and Unity were both under sailing orders. Then as soon as these signals came out, I sent the Wren messenger down to Seal and Unity with them.’         

Question: ‘Do you remember handing message 1428/29/4 from Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth, concerning movements of certain ships?’

    Tel. Marks: ‘I cannot remember handling that one sir.’

It would appear that there was no one who could state beyond any doubt that Leading Signalman Moon, or anyone else from Unity actually collected or had been handed signal 1428/29/4. Obviously, what Thomas Moon had to say to the court in connection with the signal was the greatest importance.

Question: ‘Can you explain how it was that the signal 1428/29/4 form the Commander-in-Chief, Rosyth, was not delivered either to the captain of Unity nor to any of Unity’s officers?’

    Ldg.Sig. Moon: ‘No.’

Question: ‘did you collect any signals from the Signal Distribution Office shortly before sailing?’

    Ldg.Sig. Moon: ‘Just before she sailed.’

Question: ‘Have you recollection as to whether the signal 1428/29/4 was among those that you collected?’

    Ldg.Sig. Moon: ‘No.’

Question: ‘What did you do with the signals you collected from the DSO on the afternoon of 29 April?’

    Ldg.Sig. Moon: ‘The only signals I can remember collecting from the DSO were I think two QZHs. Four more QZHs were sent down by special messenger just before we sailed. These had been handed to the first lieutenant, who gave them to me. No other signals were received by me.’ 

As John Low, the first lieutenant was dead, and as all of Unity’s confidential books, signals publications, and other confidential papers had gone down with the submarine, the question of whether the signal had been received by Unity could not be fully substantiated. And there the matter was laid to rest. Perhaps it was only to be expected that Lieutenant Brooks and Leading signalman Moon should come in for certain amount of criticism from the court. Unity’s patrol orders had stated that she was to proceed with ‘dispatch’. This expression was regarded by submarine officers as implying that a submarine is to proceed on the surface by day, unless compelled to dive, and did not necessarily have the same meaning applicable to surface ships to proceed at three-fifths power. Unity had been proceeding at 8 knots – too fast in the limited visibility thought the court, particularly in view of the fact that information contained in the appendix to Unity’s patrol orders indicated that the enemy were unlikely to be in the vicinity, thus the need for speed was not pressing. The court also felt that Lieutenant Brooks’ failure to use sound signals until the siren of another vessel was heard was a mistake. Very much in Brooks’ favour was his rapid realization that nothing was going to save Unity from sinking, and sinking quickly. If Brooks had hesitated in the hope that something could be done to save the submarine, then many of the crew might have perished. The decision of the court as regards Lieutenant Brooks was that sufficient blame could be attributed to him to justify any disciplinary action against him.

The court was of the opinion that Leading Signalman Moon had collected signal 1428/29/4 (and also Captain S6’s signal 1552/29/4 which referred to the former) from the Signal Distribution Office of HMS Elfin at some time before Unity sailed. In giving evidence, Moon had clearly denied all knowledge of the signals. The failure of the signals’ contents to be made known to Brooks had without doubt been a contributing factor of the collision with Atle Jarl. Although much of the blame for Unity’s loss was directed towards Thomas Moon, a certain degree of responsibility must rest with Lieutenant Brooks and Captain Submarine’s Staff Officer, since they failed to discuss the latest information concerning movements in the war channel, one of the very things for which last-minute meetings at the signal office had been designed.

Though Leading Signalman Moon had been considered neglectful in his duty, the probability of obtaining sufficient evidence to secure a conviction for the offence was deemed remote, and so the assembly of a court martial was not considered justified. It was also considered undesirable that the offence should be dealt with summarily, as the powers of punishment of Captain S would not be compatible with the offence and its consequences. Moon later joined Utmost (Lieutenant-Commander R.D. Cayley). When Cayley moved on to command P311 he took with him Leading Signalman Moon. Moon lost his life when P311 was sunk with all hands. As Cayley appears to have thought highly of Thomas Moon, Moon must have been a very competent Signalman.

Unity had been commissioned in August 1938. Her first captain had been Lieutenant-Commander S.H. Pinchin. After ten months with Unity, Pinchin relinquished command to Lieutenant J.F.B. Brown. Brown had been in command for two months when war broke out. He did eight patrols before being relieved by Brooks on 20 April 1940, so Brooks had been Unity’s captain for only nine days when she sunk.

Lieutenant Brooks had taken his COQC (Perisher) in April 1939. The following July he had been appointed captain of L23. Brooks had been Spare CO at Blyth for three weeks when appointed to Unity. After survivors’ leave he took command of Upright at Barrow on 5 July 1940. Brooks did two patrols from Portsmouth prior to taking Upright to the Mediterranean, where she became the first ‘U’ class to do a patrol. In December 1940 he was relieved of his command. In February 1942 Brooks joined the staff at HMS Dolphin, the submarine base. After five months he transferred to the Admiralty’s Operations Division Staff. On 3 June 1943 Lieutenant-Commander Brooks took to the air in a Beaufighter of W/236 Squadron, probably as an observer. Shortly after becoming airborne the Beaufighter was attacked by 8 Ju88s. The navigator, acting as rear-gunner, was severely wounded. With Francis Brooks having taken over as rear-gunner, the pilot dived to sea-level. The Ju88s remained in pursuit, scoring several hits on the Beaufighter. During one of these attacks Brooks was mortally wounded. Though further damaged, the Beaufighter managed to shake off the enemy and reach Predannack, where she crashed-landed. Thus did Unity’s captain fail to survive the war.

The report made by Lieutenant Brooks on the exemplary conduct of his ship’s company during the collision and its after effects was not ignored by the Navy.

The exemplary conduct of Lieutenant John Low and Able Seaman Henry Miller did not go unrecognised.

The calm demeanour of Lieutenant Low had done much to assist in a speedy and orderly escape. His concern for the safety of the crew and the manner in which he had fulfilled his duty was in keeping with the highest standard expected of submarine officers. Both Low and Miller could not have been aware of the fearful risk of remaining below decks to assist and give every opportunity of clearing the submarine.

Reported in the London Gazette, 16 August 1940 for gallantry when sunk in collision:

Lieutenant John Niven Angus Low and Able Seaman Henry James Miller, the Empire Gallantry Medal, which was later upgraded to the George Cross (posthumously). The next of kin of both submariners were presented the medal by the King at an Investiture at Buckingham Palace.

Reported in the London Gazette, 1 January 1941 – New Year’s Honours List for gallantry when sunk in collision: The following members were Mentioned in Despatches (MiD): POTEL Ernest Gregory, LEUT George Edward Hunt, CERA Alfred Potter and LTEL George William Tuson.                                   

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