

HMAS Submarine Otama Senate Inquiry

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade - 24/07/98 - Military justice procedures

CHAIRMAN —Welcome. I must advise you that the proceedings here today are legal proceedings of the parliament and warrant the same respect which proceedings in the respective houses of parliament demand. Although the subcommittee does not require you to give evidence on oath, you should be aware that this does not alter the importance of the occasion. The deliberate misleading of the subcommittee may be regarded as a contempt of the parliament. The subcommittee prefers that all evidence is given in public, but should you at any stage wish to give any evidence in private, you may ask to do so, and the committee will give consideration to your request. We have received your submission and it was authorised for publication. We have also received a second submission from you.

Resolved (on motion by Mr Bevis):

That the document from Commodore Dunne into the inquiry into military justice procedures be received as evidence and authorised for publication.

CHAIRMAN —I now invite you, Commodore Dunne, to make a short opening statement if you wish to do so.

Cdre Dunne —Thank you. I would like to use the second submission as the basis of my opening statement. It will go on for about 10 or 15 minutes. I think it answers a lot of the questions that you might like to ask me. My objective in bringing this case to your attention is to demonstrate to you the unsatisfactory judicial procedures which followed the naval board of inquiry set up to investigate the accidental death of two sailors from HMAS *Otama* on 3 August 1987. As you probably know, I was the president of that board. Our report was submitted to the fleet commander, Rear Admiral Peter Sinclair, on 25 August 1987.

Over the years since that tragic accident, I have been deeply concerned that justice in this case was neither done nor seen to be done. I have tried in vain to come to terms with the strange decisions taken by higher authority in response to the findings of negligence made, in no uncertain terms, by my board of inquiry. The finding of negligence was also made about a year later in the report of the state coroner's inquest into the same accident. I now have other important information which bears on the accident, of which I was unaware at the time of the board of inquiry. Of particular significance was information on the submerged grounding of the *Otama* off Sydney only a few weeks before the loss of the two sailors, as on both occasions the same officer was in command of the *Otama*, Lieutenant Commander, now Commander, John Taubman.

In the course of my board of inquiry, I asked for details of the grounding and the report of the board of inquiry into that incident. At the time, my request was refused, but I later gained access to that report. I have now, very reluctantly, come to the conclusion

that, after both of these boards of inquiry, the course of justice was deliberately perverted almost certainly in order to protect certain senior officers in the submarine arm from prosecution by court martial or at least from further investigation. Although he may have been unaware of this I believe that one of these officers protected on both occasions was Lieutenant Commander Taubman.

Last year, shortly before I retired from the navy, I read about your inquiry into military justice procedures. I realised that this offered me an unexpected opportunity to bring my concerns to official notice at an impartial forum. I hope to make a useful contribution in this way to your consideration of the broad issues of military justice procedures, and thereby to help ensure that future decisions taken by higher authority in these cases involving negligence or misconduct are more equitable and more transparent.

Now I would like to turn to the accident which is the subject of my submission and the important background information which has come to my notice since my board of inquiry. Throughout June and July of 1987, *Otama* was being prepared to undertake a highly classified surveillance operation. For this task, the submarine had been fitted with a range of special surveillance equipment—including a towed array passive sonar system—and the crew had been trained to an advanced level of operational capability.

Trials of the special equipment had been undertaken and the sea training staff from *Platypus* had conducted the safety training for the crew. The final safety assessment was made by the submarine squadron commander, Captain Peter Briggs. He judged Lieutenant Commander Taubman and his crew to have achieved an above average standard by early July 1987. The operational training and assessment of *Otama* had been delegated to Commander Kim Pitt, then the fleet submarine operations officer on the staff of the fleet commander. I believe this was done because Commander Pitt had first-hand command experience of surveillance operations, whereas Captain Briggs did not.

The culmination of all this training was an OPEX—an acronym for operational exercise—conducted by *Otama* over a two-week period in the Sydney-Jervis Bay exercise areas in July 1987. During the OPEX, the surface units exercising in the area were not informed of the presence of *Otama*. The submarine was required to remain submerged and undetected by surface ships and aircraft, moving as necessary to intercept all shipping detected, taking photographic, acoustic and electronic recordings.

CHAIRMAN —I thought from your evidence *Otama* proceeded leading the surface ships out of Sydney Harbour, so they must have known it was present.

Cdre Dunne —No. This is another incident two weeks before, Senator.

CHAIRMAN —I am sorry.

Cdre Dunne —And the ships and the submarine had sailed separately, and the submarine was not known to be at sea.

CHAIRMAN —My apology.

Cdre Dunne —In an exercise of this nature, there are inherent risks, and the responsibility carried by the commanding officer for the safety of the submarine is absolute. On the morning of the submerged grounding accident, *Otama* was at periscope depth, silently approaching the two frigates, which were almost stopped and preparing to conduct a towing exercise. The frigates were not operating their active sonars, as they assumed that there were no submarines in the area.

As *Otama* approached to within a thousand yards of the leading frigate, the submarine went into a well-rehearsed procedure of making recordings as she moved slowly down the frigate's starboard side. Short periscope observations were taken by the commanding officer to confirm the situation and to ensure safety. As *Otama* passed clear of the leading frigate, the commanding officer raised his periscope for a longer look and to make a visual correlation of the frigate's radars. But, in doing so, he seems to have forgotten that the second frigate, under tow, was following close astern of the first. Lookouts on board the second frigate sighted *Otama's* periscope during its prolonged exposure, close on that ship's starboard bow. The alarm was raised and both frigates switched on their active sonars quickly gaining contact. As no Australian submarines were believed to be in the area, the frigates assumed that an intruder had been detected, possibly from the Soviet Union.

The OPEX orders held on board *Otama* stated that, if detected by surface units, *Otama* should immediately identify herself on the acoustic underwater telephone and state that special trials were being conducted. These orders, however, were disregarded by Lieutenant Commander Taubman, who decided to attempt to evade the frigates by increasing the submarine's depth. Lieutenant Commander Taubman ordered the submarine deeper, but it appears that he forgot to check his position on the chart to ascertain the depth of water available. The outcome was that as the submarine passed through 300 feet it struck the bottom with considerable force. Fortunately, the bottom was sandy; had it been rocky, this incident could have had extremely serious, even fatal, consequences.

At this point, Commander Pitt intervened and ordered Lieutenant Commander Taubman to terminate the OPEX, break off his evasion and report his identity to the frigates. He was then to surface and return to Sydney for damage assessment.

A naval board of inquiry into the grounding was duly convened by the fleet commander. Two members of the board were submarine officers, Lieutenant Commander John Hodges and Lieutenant Commander Richard Shalders. The board reported in late July while *Otama* was still alongside the submarine base at Neutral Bay, Sydney.

I find it surprising and extraordinary, given the circumstances of the failed OPEX

and the personality traits revealed, that Lieutenant Taubman was left in command of *Otama* for the forthcoming surveillance operation. This decision was made by Rear Admiral Sinclair after he had considered the report of the board of inquiry. I now know that vital evidence relating to Lieutenant Commander Taubman's reactions and decisions during this incident, including tape recordings made in the control room,

had been concealed from the board of inquiry investigating the grounding. Why this detection and grounding incident was covered up has never been made clear.

[Mr PRICE](#) —You were aware of the incident, though, when you were chairing your board of inquiry?

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Mr PRICE](#) —But this vital piece of evidence was—

Cdre Dunne —Yes. Why this detection and grounding incident was covered up has never been made clear, but covered up it was. Lieutenant Taubman was endorsed to proceed on the planned surveillance operation as if he had passed his OPEX and as if nothing untoward had occurred. This outcome is in marked contrast to the action taken in February of this year after *Otama* had again grounded while submerged off Sydney. On this occasion, following a board of inquiry, the commanding officer was relieved of his command by the maritime commander, Rear Admiral Ritchie.

Now I will move on to the disastrous incident which resulted in the deaths of two young sailors and the judicial procedures which ensued. *Otama* sailed from Sydney at nine o'clock on 3 August 1987. In my then present appointment as captain of HMAS *Watson* , and the director of surface warfare training, I was scheduled to join HMAS *Darwin* by helicopter on Wednesday, 5 August to observe the final two days assessment of the students on the surface warfare officers course embarked in the warships working with *Otama* .

I was informed of the *Otama* incident by Lieutenant Commander John Hodges. Visibly upset, he told me that *Otama* had dived leaving two sailors on the casing and they had subsequently been lost. Initially, I didn't believe him. Such an event was impossible. He continued, stating he bore a degree of responsibility for the deaths as he had not stood by his beliefs when serving on the recent board of inquiry into *Otama* 's grounding. He told me that the board had been pressured by Captain Briggs to find that there was no case to answer against Lieutenant Commander Taubman. This was confirmed the following week by a similar statement to me by Lieutenant Commander Richard Shalders, a second member of the same board of inquiry.

I was contacted by the fleet legal officer that afternoon and informed I was to head a board of inquiry into the two deaths. Commander Tony Smith, a submarine command qualified officer, and Commander Ian Whitehouse, a navigator, were to assist me as

members of the board of inquiry, while Mr Tom Harrison, a barrister and former submarine officer, was appointed as counsel assisting. The board was set up in the Submarine School of HMAS *Platypus* , Neutral Bay, and started preparations immediately. It was a closed board, not open to the public.

Otama returned to Sydney at midday on Wednesday, 5 August, after 48 hours of searching for the bodies of the two lost sailors. Commander Smith went directly on board and, with the assistance of Lieutenant Earlam, the executive officer and second-in-command of *Otama* , took possession of a number of statements made by members

of the ship's company and a series of tape recordings from the control room monitoring system.

That evening, I made an initial report to Admiral Sinclair and was told by him that he had decided that *Otama* should go back to sea the following Monday with Taubman in command. He used the analogy of a thrown horse rider getting back into the saddle as quickly as possible before he lost his nerve. He also directed that no *Otama* witnesses could be called on Friday, 7 August as it was intended to hold a memorial service for the dead sailors at Garden Island Chapel. I was being pressured to conclude the BOI as quickly as possible and felt that Admiral Sinclair had already made up his mind that Taubman was to be protected. After working through the weekend I advised Admiral Sinclair that, in my opinion, *Otama* was not safe to go to sea on Monday, 10 August.

The board of inquiry report details what occurred on board *Otama* on 3 August 1987, and I will not repeat that here, other than to say that, after 11 years, I have no doubt of the accuracy of that report. When presenting the report to Admiral Sinclair, I gave him a detailed verbal brief on my concerns regarding Lieutenant Commander Taubman and stated that in my opinion he should not be allowed to command a submarine again. I told the admiral that I believed Taubman had perjured himself, and pointed to transcripts of evidence where this had occurred. I believed at the time Taubman would be court-martialled and removed from *Otama* .

However, this was not what Admiral Sinclair intended. Influenced, I believe, by Captain Briggs and others, he wrote to Admiral Hudson, the Chief of Naval Staff, on 11 September 1987, forwarding his comments on the board of inquiry and outlining his recommendations. In that letter he questioned the motivation and professional competence of myself and Commander Smith. Admiral Hudson received further advice from Captain Roach, the Director of Submarine Policy in Navy Office, Canberra. Roach advised Hudson that Taubman should not be court-martialled but be given a note of displeasure and allowed to take *Otama* back to sea. I believe Roach would have given this advice after discussions with Captain Briggs.

Admiral Hudson took the advice offered to him by Admiral Sinclair, Captain Briggs and Captain Roach and announced his decision on the results of the board of inquiry via a press release on Friday, 18 December 1987. This announcement made no reference to the findings of negligence by the board of inquiry, nor to the

recommendations that disciplinary action should be taken against the commanding officer, Lieutenant Commander John Taubman.

But that was not the end of the matter. The State Coroner, Mr Kevin Waller, took an interest, as it seemed to him that this was something which should just not happen. A police task force, Gamma, was formed under Detective Sergeant Bruce Shiels and accumulated evidence throughout 1988. I was interviewed about various aspects of the incident, and the police kept returning to the reasons Admiral Sinclair and Captain Briggs might have had in protecting Taubman.

The navy did not regard the intervention of the Coroner with enthusiasm. Admiral Hudson instructed the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Naval Legal

Services to stop the Coroner's inquiry. In the first instance, the Navy challenged the State Coroner's jurisdiction as the deaths of the two sailors had occurred at sea in international waters. But, given that *Otama* was based in Sydney and had both sailed and returned to that port, this challenge was quickly set aside.

Then, Mr Murray Tobias QC, at the direction of Admiral Hudson, argued that the coronial inquest should not proceed as the navy had already conducted its own board of inquiry and had come to a financial settlement with the two families. The navy also refused the Coroner access to the board of inquiry report on the grounds of national security, and some officers, on advice from Naval Legal Services, refused to be interviewed by the police task force.

The inquest was conducted at the Coroner's Court, Glebe, in October and November 1988, and Mr Waller's report dated 11 November 1988 was previously forwarded to this committee. Mr Waller referred to the personal responsibility of Taubman and stated:

I would assess his personal responsibility as in the higher range.

In his book *Suddenly Dead*, published in 1994, Mr Waller is a little more forthright, writing:

. . . the testimony of the (naval) witnesses showed a disturbing state of affairs aboard the boat. There was plenty of evidence of negligence in this case.

Commander Smith left the Navy in the weeks following the *Otama* inquiry, telling me that he was deeply disturbed by both the unprofessional conduct of Lieutenant Commander Taubman and the high level of protection he was receiving from senior officers.

In conclusion, Mr Chairman, I suggest that the principal lesson to be drawn from the *Otama* incident for military justice procedures in the ADF is this: it is both inappropriate and inconsistent to have, as the convening authority of a military board of inquiry, an officer who may have been responsible, because of his appointment, for the

circumstances leading to the incident being inquired into. To have the same officer then review the findings and recommendations of such an inquiry, when the findings may have been critical of his own prior role, defies both commonsense and natural justice.

I believe it is time the ADF had an independent judicial branch to inquire into such incidents as is the case in the United Kingdom and the United States. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRMAN —Commodore, were you satisfied with the way the board of inquiry was set up? You were a submarine commander yourself at one stage, and do you think you were in a position where you could be seen to be independent?

Cdre Dunne —In retrospect, no. I think the weakness of my board of inquiry was the fact that I was one of the senior submarine commanding officers in the RAN, and it was easy after the event to turn that against me in terms of my personal interest in the outcome, or it could be seen that I might have had a personal interest in dirtying the name of my peers or seniors. Indeed, that was what occurred.

CHAIRMAN —With respect to the accuracy of the outcome from the board of inquiry, could the role of president of the board have been fulfilled just as effectively by a captain of a DDG or a FFG?

Cdre Dunne —No. What was required on the board was an officer with my experience but not necessarily as the president.

CHAIRMAN —Somebody who had had command experience of a surface ship would not have been in a position to be an adequate president, in your judgment?

Cdre Dunne —No. He could have been an adequate president as long as there was somebody else on the board—

CHAIRMAN —Supporting technical advisers?

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —That is what I am driving at.

Cdre Dunne —If I could use the *Westralia* board as an example—and without prejudging any of the outcomes of that board—the constitution of the board appeared to me to be much more sensible than the one that I had for *Otama*. I do not think the rank was right with the *Otama* one; I think a commodore would have been better than a captain, as was the case with *Westralia*. A senior seaman commodore, supported by me or another submarine CO, would have been a better level.

CHAIRMAN —You have made allegations that you were pressured to wind the inquiry up quickly. Admiral Sinclair has written to the committee refuting that. But, putting that issue aside, do you feel that in any way you were obstructed in the prosecution of your inquiry by Navy or Defence in any other ways?

Cdre Dunne —No, only with the time issue; pressure was put on there. The witnesses were not very forthcoming and it was a struggle to get at the truth of the matter, but the navy did not interfere with the conduct of the inquiry as such, no.

CHAIRMAN —It has been argued before the committee that there ought to be no defence by certain members of the ADF on the grounds that they would incriminate themselves if they gave evidence. Apparently one witness who has written to us has claimed that in some police forces police are compelled to answer all questions that are put to them at an inquiry, whereas that does not apply in the ADF. Have you a view on that?

Cdre Dunne —Yes, I think they should be required to answer questions. In the first instance, we were trying to get at the truth of the matter to ensure that the next submarine we sent out to sea was not going to have a similar occurrence because of some deficiencies in the procedures we had. I was fairly comfortable that the procedures were okay, but we had to make sure that that was the case. If you have witnesses who will not answer questions or who tell lies, it is very difficult to get to the truth of what occurred.

CHAIRMAN —Yes, but you just said that the procedures were okay. I am reading your submission, which is rather a lengthy one—and I am not criticising you for that at all, because I think it is a complex subject—and it seems to me that the procedures were pretty slipshod. You wrote your name or you put a tally before you went up the conning tower or out onto the weather deck. If there is an emergency or you are in a hurry, it is very easy for that to pass. It seems to me that there were no effective measures of knowing where everyone was on the ship at the time.

Cdre Dunne —There were, but they just were not applied on that submarine.

[Mr PRICE](#) —I thought in your submission you made the point—or it may have been in the board of inquiry report—that there were some formalised procedures but that others were more a matter of tradition rather than being formalised.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Mr PRICE](#) —That seems to me to have been a weakness in the system.

Cdre Dunne —It was a weakness, yes. That was in the board of inquiry report.

CHAIRMAN —Admiral Hudson is arguing that a board of inquiry's findings are not binding on the convening authority. I can see the academic basis for that but surely there is not much point in having a board of inquiry if its recommendations are not applied?

Cdre Dunne —I agree entirely. It is the same with *Westralia* , I do not know what the board is going to come out with there but if the same thing happened to that, its recommendations would be just be put in the bottom draw and nothing would occur.

CHAIRMAN —Are you aware of other occasions where the recommendations of boards of inquiry have not been implemented by the army, navy or the air force?

Cdre Dunne —No, I am not.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —On the procedural point that the board inquires into the circumstances, identifies the facts and then makes some recommendations to the convening authority about what it thinks should be done, including any disciplinary action, given that the current process is that that is only a recommendation and the convening authority is obliged to exercise an independent discretion in looking at that and determining what there needs to be done, what is the purpose of having a board of inquiry with a recommendation? In other words, is there any value in separating out the roles of the

board of inquiry so that the board actually does investigate what transpires and makes the finding of facts and does not bother making any recommendations?

Whilst it may be the practice that overwhelmingly those recommendations are adopted, my understanding is that as a matter of law they are not to be rubber stamped, they are to be independently assessed by the convening authority. If they are to be independently assessed by the convening authority, why bother getting the board to make a recommendation on discipline, why not just get the board to do the factual stuff?

Cdre Dunne —Some boards are given terms of reference that do just that.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Do you have a view about that as a structural thing in terms of how these matters should be dealt with?

Cdre Dunne —I have a view. As I said in my closing paragraph, my view is that a board of inquiry does serve a very useful purpose of not only getting to the facts of the matter but also of forming a view of what the future action should be, including disciplinary action. The big weakness in the system is that those recommendations then go back to a convening authority who has got an overwhelming interest in the outcome in that he is in the firing line, he may bear a degree of responsibility for what has occurred. That is the weakness. It is very easy just to chop the board off there and say, 'We are taking this no further because if we do then I am going to get burnt.' That is what happened in the *Otama* one.

Of course there is no legal requirement for the convening authority to adopt the recommendations of the board of inquiry, and that authority would be stupid to do so if the board was recommending that the convening authority should be court-martialled. That is the weakness in the system.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —So if you had an independent judicial arrangement whereby the convening authority was separate to the command structure, would you then envisage that the board of inquiry would need to make a recommendation on action, or could you restrict the board to dealing only with an investigation of the incident?

Cdre Dunne —Given that the board has spent a lot of time and expertise in investigating a situation, it would be wise to make the best use of that investment and get some recommendations for future action out of it. Those future investigations have got to be taken separately from what the board has found, and that is the case now if you continue through. It gives you a steer of where you should be looking. The person who makes the decision to take the follow up action must be independent of the people who have been involved in the accident occurring in the first place.

I joined the navy the year before *Voyager* was sunk and I was at the naval college when it happened. My first impression of boards of inquiry, royal commissions and courts martial was all to do with the *Melbourne* and the *Voyager*. That left a big impression, particularly as I knew blokes on the *Voyager* who had been at the naval college with me. It was obvious that that inquiry was not being done correctly. It was

obvious that people were getting in there and stirring the pot and protecting their own backs. It has happened for the whole of my 35 years of naval career.

I was involved in one inquiry 11 years ago. I have not made it an obsession but I was determined one day to try to put it right, and this was the opportunity.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Under any of the various structures, whatever structure the board fits into, clearly it has to operate with independence. You have indicated that you felt under pressure to conclude the matter.

Cdre Dunne —I was under extreme pressure.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Can you tell us what that was? You commented that you were under pressure about timing, but you also indicated that you believed that the convening authority, or other senior officers, already had a view about the conclusions before your board had its first day of hearing.

Cdre Dunne —Yes. I do not know the reasons but Lieutenant Commander Taubman was protected right from the start. He was protected when he put the submarine aground two weeks previously, and he should have been removed then. I have had arguments with Commander Pitt and Captain Briggs over that, the professional judgment

to leave Taubman there.

After the second incident there is absolutely no doubt that the man should have been removed from his submarine. In any other navy in the world he would have been, without a doubt. That is a professional judgment that every submarine commanding officer I have ever spoken to—except two—would agree with. I never understood why this man was being protected. I approached Admiral Sinclair—I had a lot of respect for Admiral Sinclair—and I spoke to him at length about this during the six months following the board of inquiry. I think Sinclair himself was under pressure from Admiral Hudson, and that was part of why Admiral Sinclair did what he did. In 1988, when another submarine ran aground, he called me across to fleet headquarters to talk about submarine operations, and he was very concerned that these incidents were continuing to occur.

I have not seen his submission. I am sure he feels very upset about what I have said but I can only report to you the way I read it, and the way I felt the pressure coming on and what he said to me. I just could not understand why they were leaving this man in command of the submarine, and neither could the police a year later.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Was the pressure coming directly from spoken words or was it by—

Cdre Dunne —It was words. It was very direct. On one particular night—I think it was Monday, 10 August—the three board members went across to see Admiral Sinclair in his headquarters at Garden Island. All three of us went in and said that if the pressure was not taken off, and if the push to get this submarine back to sea as quickly as possible was not stopped, the three of us were going to resign from the board of inquiry. I further stated that I was going to resign from the navy over it.

CHAIRMAN —What you are telling the committee is that the pressure to conclude the inquiry was to get the submarine out on an operation?

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —That presupposes then that the inquiry was going to exonerate all the crew—

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —Because it would not have been practical to put in another captain or XO or whoever else—

Cdre Dunne —They would have to retrain. They would have to go through another month of training.

CHAIRMAN —So the very fact that the pressure was put on you indicates that there was a mind set to exonerate?

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —Be that as it may—

[Mr BEVIS](#) —That was the point I wanted to clarify.

CHAIRMAN —The former CDF, General Baker, has given evidence to the committee that, even where civilian or Defence Force Disciplinary Act charges cannot be progressed, the defence reporting system provides a means whereby administrative action will clear up these glitches in the system and any officer who has made a serious error will be dealt with. Do you have confidence in that statement?

Cdre Dunne —No.

CHAIRMAN —All services have their own ethos, but is there a subset within navy of a submariner club?

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —Was Admiral Sinclair a submariner?

Cdre Dunne —No.

CHAIRMAN —Was Admiral Hudson a submariner?

Cdre Dunne —No.

CHAIRMAN —At the end of the day we are not inquiring into the correctness, or otherwise, of the retention of Lieutenant Commander Taubman. This is a very

different case from the one that immediately preceded it this morning—totally different—because here the facts are irrefutable.

The previous case was an allegation that something happened, and the service failed to investigate that. In this case, there is no doubt that two sailors died. There is also no doubt that somebody had to accept responsibility for that, and no-one was censured. I presume, from what you have said, the submarine went to sea on its next deployment, and the captain remained in command.

Cdre Dunne —That is correct.

CHAIRMAN —No-one, in any way, had their career impeded by what clearly was a major calamity.

Cdre Dunne —They were all promoted.

[Mr PRICE](#) —That is the whole point. You recommended that action be taken and they were subsequently promoted, which is a slap in the face to the board of inquiry, isn't it?

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Extraordinary.

CHAIRMAN —How do you maintain discipline in a defence force when that happens?

Cdre Dunne —With great difficulty. I think that this particular incident and the way it was handled was the start of the decline of the submarine service. I do not think the submarine service has ever recovered.

CHAIRMAN —Really?

Cdre Dunne —Really. A lot of people left, particularly sailors. A submarine commanding officer is the only person who looks through the periscope. He has total control, much more so than in a surface ship where you have a group of other senior officers supporting you. I have been the captain of both; I know the difference. But a submarine commanding officer is the one on whom all the rest depend. He is the man who makes the decisions to bring the submarine up from deep to periscope depth, which is a very dangerous procedure. He makes the decision on when to surface, when to snort. He is the man who looks through the periscope. He is the man who knows what is going on. How do you think those 80 sailors in *Otama* felt when they were sent back for the third time to sea with the man who had run them aground and then had left two of their brethren outside the pressure hull? They did not feel very confident.

[Mr PRICE](#) —I don't think I would feel confident.

Cdre Dunne —For the navy to put those sailors in that position I think was negligent, to be mild.

CHAIRMAN —Let us move into the detail of the event itself. Those two sailors would not have gone of their own volition; they would have been detailed by a petty officer or a lieutenant or someone to go—

Cdre Dunne —They were ordered to go outside.

CHAIRMAN —They were ordered to go outside. The person who gave that order would necessarily have seen that it was executed and completed, wouldn't they?

Cdre Dunne —Yes, normally.

CHAIRMAN —Why did that not happen?

Cdre Dunne —It did not happen because the order was relayed down through three or four sets of people. The two who actually went out were not the two who were initially ordered to go out, so there was a degree of shoulder sloping there. It was a miserable day. Whoever went out was going to get pretty wet and cold. In fact, it was an abnormal day. The two junior people ended up being the ones who went out. They procrastinated to a certain degree, had a coffee, got themselves warm, left it to the last minute. There were all those sorts of things going on.

Then there was a changeover of personnel in various positions on the submarine at that time, and they were just simply misplaced, overlooked. They were overlooked to the extent that the submarine dived when everybody had to go to an assigned station in the submarine. They were still not identified as not being in their assigned station. It was some half an hour—

CHAIRMAN —Whose responsibility is that—the officer of the watch?

Cdre Dunne —Once the submarine goes to diving stations, and is preparing to dive, the responsibility that everybody is in their assigned station goes back to the person who is in charge of that particular compartment where that sailor might be. One of the sailors was supposed to be on the echo sounder.

CHAIRMAN —We have two or three watches, do we not? How many watches have you got?

Cdre Dunne —They have three watches when the submarine is on the surface, but they had actually gone to a watch routine or a station called diving stations to dive the submarine under the water.

CHAIRMAN —In that condition, everyone had a assigned spot.

Cdre Dunne —Yes, everyone has an assigned spot.

CHAIRMAN —So not only the section commander but also the person of equivalent rank beside them, and other sailors, should know that Bill Smith ought to be there at his post.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —So you have multiple checks.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —None of those checks took place.

Cdre Dunne —None of those worked.

CHAIRMAN —Why was that?

Cdre Dunne —I do not know. One of the reasons was, I think, that there were so many people on board the submarine. There were 80 people on the submarine that day. The submarine is complemented for 64 or 65. They had the additional people on board because that is the sorts of numbers you need to go and do the work they were going to do. When I was the captain of *Otama* a couple of years previously, we had about 78 people on board, for the same sorts of reasons.

The difference with *Otama*, though, was that half of that ship's company—40 of the 80—had only been in submarines for a year or so. They were very inexperienced. Even though all but 18 were qualified submariners, the qualifications that some had were very thin. It was a bit of the blind leading the blind; bad habits breeding bad habits.

CHAIRMAN —Getting back to the sailors that went outside the hull, why were they not wearing life jackets and why wouldn't they have had safety lines? This is elementary on a yacht.

Cdre Dunne —The routine then—and it was a routine that had served us well—was that unless you were going out on to the casing of the submarine, outside the fin structure itself, you did not need a life jacket. On top of the fin, you were high out of the water and there was no expectation you were going to fall off. If the weather was particularly rough, you did strap yourself into the fin, but not necessarily with a life jacket.

These two boys were going into the back of the fin, which was a protected area, not onto the casing of the submarine, so there was no way that they could be washed out of the fin. That was physically impossible. So a life jacket in the confined structure of the inner fin was more of a hazard than a help.

CHAIRMAN —Why weren't the bodies in the fin?

Cdre Dunne —Because as soon as they realised the submarine was diving, first of all they went to the hatch and tried to lever the hatch open. There were markings on the hatch to indicate that that had occurred. Then they climbed up the ladder onto the top of the fin and opened the voice pipe cock to try to communicate down to the control room. As long as it is open at the top and the bottom you can make contact through the voice pipe, but it was shut at the bottom so they could not make contact. They were left on the top of the fin when the submarine finally went under.

CHAIRMAN —How many cocks are on this voice pipe?

Cdre Dunne —Two—one on the fin at the top of the bridge, the upper voice pipe cock, and another one down in the control room that shuts the voice pipe cock off at the pressure hull and makes it watertight at the pressure hull.

CHAIRMAN —So there was absolutely no way they could have communicated?

Cdre Dunne —No. Probably the only way would be to climb up the periscope and smash the top of the periscope with a knife or something like that. But I think they were panicking by that stage.

[Mr PRICE](#) —I may have just misunderstood you, but you mentioned two maritime commanders. Admiral Sinclair was the maritime commander.

Cdre Dunne —They called him the fleet commander in those days.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Right.

Cdre Dunne —He was the fleet commander, or what is now called the maritime commander. I mentioned Maritime Commander Chris Ritchie in the context of a grounding that *Otama* had in February this year off Botany Bay. There was a board of inquiry. The commanding officer of *Otama* was found to be at fault. He was taken off the submarine and another commanding officer was put onto it.

[Mr PRICE](#) —That was in exactly parallel circumstances?

Cdre Dunne —Yes. In fact, I would have thought that Taubman's actions were worse than the—

[Mr PRICE](#) —Yes.

Cdre Dunne —Taubman made a basic mistake in his processes of collecting intelligence. When he was operating against the two frigates—and we have procedures which are pretty easy as to when you put periscopes up and how you conduct yourself and how you look after the trim—what he did was almost unbelievable in putting his periscope up behind the beam of one ship and forgetting that there was another ship behind. While he was behind the first ship, he was directly ahead of the second ship, and that is the one that saw him. He lost track of the fact that there were two ships there.

To send a submarine away, to send a commanding officer away to do some sensitive work when he had made a basic mistake like that, was something that should have been sorted right out. And then he compounded the mistake by trying to evade when his orders said, 'If you are sprung, let it be known that it is you before all the P3s come

out of RAAF base Edinburgh and the whole world alights.'

[Mr PRICE](#) —Commander, you seem to be making the point that the failure to take appropriate action in the first instance of grounding really put the crew's life at risk. Without going into the detail of the mission, was the mission in peace time so sensitive and the continuation of the exercise so important that people be exonerated and able to go on?

Cdre Dunne —No. The whole point of the OPEX—the operational exercise—that we do is to confirm that the submarine is in all respects ready to go and undertake the type of activity that we worked it up for. There is always an understanding that, if the submarine commanding officer does not come through that OPEX properly, the whole thing is terminated. Unless you tick all the boxes in these sorts of activities, and make sure that you have all your ducks in row, you can come terribly unstuck.

As it turned out, after the board of inquiry, Taubman did remain in command of *Otama* but its mission was changed. It was still deployed overseas, but it did not do anything like what it was supposed to. So we got the message through, but the system did not acknowledge it and they still left Taubman there.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Commodore, I apologise. I temporarily demoted you. I will refer to you as Rear Admiral now in recognition of the service that you are doing your country today. How can the public have confidence in a board of inquiry, when a convening authority can have contact with it? I will give you a parallel in the political area. If we set up a royal commission, it would be, I think, beyond the pale for a responsible minister, or even the Prime Minister or a Premier, to have ongoing contact or even suggest to the royal commissioner, after he has been given his commission, how the inquiry should take place. If they want wider powers or time extended that is legitimate. But how can the public have confidence that boards of inquiry are truly independent if the convening authority can formally, directly or indirectly, have contact with that board of inquiry?

Cdre Dunne —I agree but, in this case, I had almost daily contact with Admiral Sinclair.

[Mr PRICE](#) —I beg your pardon?

Cdre Dunne —I had almost daily contact with Admiral Sinclair.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Daily contact?

Cdre Dunne —Yes. I was reporting to him most nights.

CHAIRMAN —You were reporting or he was talking to you?

Cdre Dunne —I was required to go across to his headquarters most evenings after the day's proceedings to—

CHAIRMAN —Who instructed you to do that?

Cdre Dunne —He did; Admiral Sinclair did.

CHAIRMAN —I see.

[Mr PRICE](#) —No wonder you felt under a bit of pressure.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Did you participate in any other boards of inquiry during your career?

Cdre Dunne —Yes, I have been on a couple of court martials. I was president of the *Darwin* court-martial when the *Darwin* was run aground in the States in 1990 in Hawaii.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —How did those other boards that you participated in, in terms of process, compare with your experience at the *Otama* inquiry?

Cdre Dunne —Court martials were different. We were not under the same sort of pressure and directions in the court martials. The *Otama* board of inquiry was the worst one I ever participated in because people were protecting themselves and protecting each other.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —I am sorry; I did not mean to cut you off.

Cdre Dunne —No.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Outside your own personal participation in boards, from your extensive experience of many years in the service, you would have been around and have been, I guess, if nothing else, in the officers' discussions in the dining room about different incidents. Is your experience with *Otama* reflected in the sorts of things that are said of other inquiries?

Cdre Dunne —No.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Then, I guess, it gets back to this particular incident. How would the system get so twisted? Why would the system get so twisted?

Cdre Dunne —You would have to ask Admiral Sinclair. I think they got themselves—when I say they, I think it was Admiral Sinclair and Captain Briggs and possibly Commander Pitt—into a situation when they exonerated Taubman over the

grounding. When he lost the two sailors, it had got to the stage where I think they all realised—certainly Commander Pitt did, because I have spoken to him about it—that a mistake had been made. They had made a bad call in leaving that officer in command of the submarine and the only way was to bluff their way out of it. Both Captain Briggs and Admiral Sinclair were very capable, very ambitious men.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Admirals do not make mistakes.

Cdre Dunne —No.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Except when they lose a fleet.

Cdre Dunne —Say again.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Except when they lose a fleet.

Cdre Dunne —The police spent some 10 months trying to unravel this. Why would they protect him?

[Mr PRICE](#) —Without the cooperation of the navy.

Cdre Dunne —Yes, without the cooperation.

[Mr PRICE](#) —I will just finish up with a few questions. You mention that you felt that some of the evidence given to the board of inquiry was misleading or false. I guess we could say that people were perjuring themselves.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Mr PRICE](#) —What remedy does a board have to insist that people state the truth?

Cdre Dunne —Evidence is taken under oath, so you have got the laws of perjury but that is just about all. The reason that we are able to make calls like that was that the first witness that we had in the stand was the captain of the submarine. The captain of the submarine was the man who should have been able to tell us what went on and why. We put him there up front. He explained his case, made some statements and denied all knowledge or responsibility. Then we analysed and broke down the tape recordings that we had from the control room monitoring system and there were words on there, spoken by Lieutenant Commander Taubman, that indicated that he did have knowledge of the two lads going into the fin.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —In your submission, I noticed that Lieutenant Commander Taubman—or it may have actually been in the BOI document—approached you, I believe, or the board to retrieve the tapes which he claimed had been improperly taken from the submarine. You refused that. Was there any suggestion to you that they should have been returned?

Cdre Dunne —No. Once I made it quite clear to Lieutenant Commander Taubman that that was the end of the conversation and that the tapes and the statements were staying where they were, nobody came back at me. But if we had not had those statements or those tapes, we would never have unravelled what occurred on that submarine.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —I would have thought the practice that your board followed in getting those tapes immediately on return of the submarine and interviewing people at the first opportunity would be precisely the practice that any competent board would undertake.

Cdre Dunne —Yes, I agree. And they are the sorts of actions that were taken by the Western Australian policemen when *Westralia* came in straight after her incident. The

New South Wales police were not involved in this nor was the coroner until six months later. That was a weakness in the system.

CHAIRMAN —In what sense? Surely, the BOI would have had to have taken place first and the coroner hardly goes in while the body is still hot.

Cdre Dunne —He did in the case of the *Westralia* incident.

CHAIRMAN —Yes, but that is unusual.

Cdre Dunne —I thought it was interesting, but it is belts and braces, and I think it certainly protects the navy and the community from any—

[Mr PRICE](#) —And the evidence.

CHAIRMAN —It leads to a multitude of questions. First of all, having read coroners' reports of a number of fatalities involving members of the ADF, I have doubts about the competence of some coroners to handle the topic—

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —Because they come from a totally different background, to be kind about it. They understand neither the culture nor the technology involved, but there is this great area of uncertainty where the civilian authorities are very reluctant to move even though the ADF says that, if it is a criminal matter, it should go through the civil courts—or whatever the legal term is—rather than be investigated by the Department of Defence authority itself. There is a very great reluctance to become involved on the part of the coroner's court. It seems to me, as an outsider, that you have got to drag the coroner in, kicking and screaming, although they will not admit to that in public. So you have this great uncertainty as to whose baby it is to be picked up and nursed.

The second point is, in relation to the *Otama*, when the coroner did move in, he found there was no criminal activity. He found no-one was to blame. Was he influenced by the actions of the maritime commander or did he genuinely come to that view?

Cdre Dunne —The coroner did not hear all the evidence. The system was selective in the evidence that the coroner was presented with. The coroner did find that there was a case of negligence but it was not criminal negligence as far as he could discern, so there is a difference between the two.

I am not saying it was criminal negligence. What I am saying is that there was negligence enough to warrant the removal of Lieutenant Commander Taubman from the submarine. If there was anything over and above that, that was something for the courts to decide.

[Mr PRICE](#) —By a court martial.

Cdre Dunne —By court martial, criminal action or whatever. Certainly I am saying that there was negligence there—the coroner said there was negligence. I believe that as a professional submarine commanding officer—and at the time I was the most

experienced in the Royal Australian Navy, and probably still am. I was making those calls up until six months before this, when Commander Pitt relieved me. For three years, I was the submarine commanding officer who was running the OPEXs and firing COs off submarines because they were not up to scratch. I was not all that much out of date when I was making this call, and I still stand by it. There was negligence there.

I think the evidence that the coroner heard was selective. He certainly never heard any professional submarine advice that gave the other side of the story. The professional submariners that were called in before the coroner, as expert witnesses, weren't any that were going to say that Lieutenant Commander Taubman had erred professionally. I was never asked to give evidence to the coroner, and Commander Smith was never asked to give evidence to the coroner. The submarine commanding officers that were called in were basically supportive of Taubman's actions. It was stitched up, to a certain extent, by the navy.

CHAIRMAN —Was there a proposal ever to court-martial some of the junior ratings?

Cdre Dunne —Yes, there was.

CHAIRMAN —How could that be contemplated?

Cdre Dunne —I do not know.

CHAIRMAN —Surely the captain is the responsible person.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —If there is any action taken, it must be taken against the captain, and it should have been taken, I would submit, in this case.

Cdre Dunne —That is why the proposals to go ahead with the court martials of Sublieutenant Webber and Petty Officer Weymouth—I think they were the two who were identified—didn't go ahead, for the simple reason that their legal advice was, 'If you go ahead against these two juniors, we are going to get after the captain.' It was inconsistent.

CHAIRMAN —It would have been quite proper to charge the captain before a court martial, in my judgment, not only to enforce discipline, but to give him the opportunity to clear his name. His professional career was at stake—

[Mr PRICE](#) —No, it wasn't. He got promoted. It wasn't at stake.

CHAIRMAN —No, it is forever blighted.

Cdre Dunne —Yes, it is. You are absolutely right. That would have cleared the air.

CHAIRMAN —Yes.

Cdre Dunne —I think it was foolish not to have done so.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Commodore, General Baker said to the committee that when the forces did not proceed with things like court martials, they were able to take administrative action or, effectively, put a black ball or a black spot on a career, but this didn't obviously take place in this instance. Do you have any faith in assurances that were given to the committee about administrative action?

Cdre Dunne —No.

[Mr PRICE](#) —How can we establish a board of inquiry and have confidence that a very senior officer in the services will not demand a president report daily to him?

Cdre Dunne —I don't think it happened in the *Westralia* one. The way the ADF has it set up at the moment, allowing the convening authority to be in that line of command, just leaves it open to that sort of abuse. It comes back to depending on personalities. If you have a personality like the present maritime commander, who is a pretty straight arrow, the last thing he would do is interfere with—

CHAIRMAN —It may well be that a safety element is emerging in the case of aircraft and naval accidents through the inquiry, and there may be a legitimate reason for the person—

Cdre Dunne —But that can be passed across very quickly. You do not have to be the convening authority of a board of inquiry to get quick feedback on—

CHAIRMAN —Okay.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —Especially when it is a public inquiry like the *Westralia* .

Cdre Dunne —That is another thing.

[Mr PRICE](#) —This is my concern: is every board of inquiry now going to be public? If it is, it gives you some reassurance about independence.

Cdre Dunne —There is no reason why the *Otama* one should not have been public.

[Mr PRICE](#) —I entirely agree.

Cdre Dunne —The system was that the navy used the word surveillance to try to stamp 'top secret' on everything. That is why I have been quite open today in using words like surveillance and intelligence collection, because that is what submarines do. It is acknowledged in the white papers that we have written since the mid-1980s that that is what we have got submarines for—and selective submarines that are highly trained do do it. I was the captain of one. But you have to make sure, if you do these things, that you are watertight, otherwise there will be extreme political embarrassment, amongst other things.

CHAIRMAN —I am not too happy that you go around trailing aerials and periscopes within a few hundred feet of ships. That alarms me.

Cdre Dunne —That is my point.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —In an issue like the *Otama* , I think there probably would have been some people say, 'Because this is surveillance, because of that particular task, these are things that you could not have on public display.' Your assessment is that the inquiry into the incident, which you were the presiding officer of, could have been conducted in public—

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —without harm to the operation of the *Otama* and its future role or other such considerations.

Cdre Dunne —Yes. Certain parts of the evidence may have had to have been taken in camera. We had civilian lawyers there for the whole of it; they had no special clearances. There were about 11 of them at one stage.

[Senator BOURNE](#) —The first of my questions was your view on open versus closed inquiries. I think you have answered that, that in general it is quite reasonable.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Senator BOURNE](#) —Plus it gives the general public, and also the families of anyone who is involved who has lost their life, confidence that at least they know what is going on. The second of my questions is that you mentioned the *Westralia* inquiry, and that you thought it was a better way to go primarily because of the rank of the person in charge. Are there any other parallels that you would draw with the setting up of that inquiry and the way it was constituted?

Cdre Dunne —I was pleasantly surprised at the way the *Westralia* inquiry was formed and the way it went. There was the openness, the involvement of the minister up-front who made some statements, the formation of the board at the right sort of level with the commodore in charge for that type of inquiry—and, I think, a carefully thought out commodore—the fact there were two civilian experts on the board, and the fact that they were given an extension of time and not pressured to come up with results.

It would appear to me that many of the things that I have been criticising over *Otama* have been put right with *Westralia* , with the exception that Rear Admiral Ritchie has been put in the hot seat as the convening authority. He has now got to review the report of the board of inquiry into *Westralia* . It will be interesting to see what those outcomes are. What is going to happen to that report now? I have absolutely no concerns about the integrity of Rear Admiral Ritchie, but there is still a long way to go after that, to see what sort of actions are taken.

[Mr PRICE](#) —If we had a military director of prosecutions that would be the office that would review the recommendations of the board and decide. That then absolutely frees the integrity of our maritime commander.

Cdre Dunne —It frees the good man and freezes out the odd rotten apple.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —You have been in command of ships, you have been responsible for allocating responsibilities to others in the fleet, and you have had the experience with

this board of inquiry. One of the central arguments about whether you have this independent strain for judicial matters—defence office of prosecutions or whatever—is whether or not that seriously undermines the command structure that is essential to the proper functioning of any military.

Cdre Dunne —It does not undermine the good commander; it supplements him and gives him strength. A good commander should not be frightened of being looked at in a proper way. If there are things wrong with the command, what better way to sort it out? That is the way the Americans do it.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —You might be interested to have a look at a recent report that has just been done for Defence, the Abadee report, which includes some recommendations on that. In fact that particular recommendation is one of the few that Defence has decided not to adopt.

CHAIRMAN —We must draw this to a close.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Could I ask some questions please, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRMAN —It is twenty six minutes past time. What is your question?

[Mr PRICE](#) —Perhaps I could just have the same leeway as you have given yourself. I am really interested in the independence of the board of inquiry. Would you see the committee being too dogmatic if we were to suggest that boards of inquiry should always be public, or that there should always be independent or civilian people or persons on a board of inquiry? If not, where do you see that coming?

Cdre Dunne —Only by exception should they not be public. In most cases it would be appropriate to have civilians on them. The *Westralia* , again, is a good model. I am waiting to see what the outcome might be.

[Mr PRICE](#) —With great respect, let me just say that it took a horrific disaster, Black Hawk, before they took that step. I congratulate them and I congratulate them on *Westralia* , but there was one hell of a message.

Cdre Dunne —I have not talked about Black Hawk. I suspect the outcome of the Black Hawk board of inquiry is not too different from the *Otama* one. It appears to me that there have been 18 boys killed and nobody is held accountable.

[Mr PRICE](#) —And nobody is guilty. Absolutely. In terms of making it the exception, should there be a requirement that the public be informed as to why it is a closed inquiry?

Cdre Dunne —Yes. A closed inquiry would be very rare and there would have to be a very good explanation as to why it was so. It helps everybody to have it open because it stops all the innuendo and the misinformation that goes around.

[Mr BEVIS](#) —One of the difficulties with the open inquiry though is that if you have a board of inquiry where military personnel are required to answer questions in public—going back to an earlier point about whether you provide incriminating

evidence against yourself—and that is subsequently used in legal proceedings, that does present a dysfunction between the two. With legal proceedings people are entitled to certain rights which are being suggested they should not be entitled to at a board. That is the catch-22.

Cdre Dunne —Yes. I am not a lawyer.

[Mr PRICE](#) —You were making too much sense, with respect, Commodore, to be a lawyer. The public, if not the service personnel, are getting very frustrated. You have this loss of life and no-one is adjudged responsible. You mentioned the number of people, but in your board or your submission you point out that there was really quite inadequate training in a significant number of people. I do not understand how you can have the crew embarked as being fit and proper to run the submarine, but there are all these training gaps in significant ranked officers or petty officers.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

[Mr PRICE](#) —Was there a change to that after the accident, or could this still be the case today?

Cdre Dunne —I think that it is still the case today. The submarine services have always had problems attracting and retaining high quality people.

[Mr PRICE](#) —So this is a function of the wastage rate?

Cdre Dunne —Yes. In 1987 the wastage rate of submariners was pretty high. It was probably the No. 1 problem. Captain Briggs was very aggressive in getting the numbers up and he probably pushed it too far with the training pipeline and people going through too quickly. As a result, *Otama* was significantly diluted in experience levels and even though they will put their hands up and say, 'But there are only 18 trainees on board.' In fact, if you look deeper, as I said before, 50 per cent of the ship's company had only been in submarines for a year, as well as the trainees, so there was not all that much experience about.

[Senator BOURNE](#) —I had one more question about the independence of a triservice legal branch. Could you think about that and let us know your thoughts? I do not want to make you think about something that is completely different.

Cdre Dunne —Yes.

CHAIRMAN —Commodore, I would like to thank you for your attendance here today. If you provide additional material, would you please forward it to the secretary. You will be sent a copy of the transcript by Hansard of your evidence to which you can make corrections of grammar and fact.

Cdre Dunne —Thank you, Mr Chairman.

[11.47 a.m.]

<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:committees%2Fcommjnt%2Fs0000516.sgm%2F0006>